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Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) can be defined as large, contiguous 
protected areas spanning international boundaries. Over the past decade, interest in 
TFCAs in southern Africa has exploded. Much of this interest can be attributed to the 
plethora of benefits touted by proponents, a number of which are community-based. The 
realization of community-based benefits requires local communities to be intimately 
involved in the TFCA management and planning process. In addition to being a desired 
requisite for TFCA initiatives, community involvement may also be a mandate of 
international law.
Recognizing that TFCAs are international entities and - in theory - subject to 
international law, this study seeks to assess the current and potential role of international 
law in TFCA-based community involvement. At present, there are treaties and 
conventions in place that suggest community involvement in TFCA initiatives is a 
mandate of international law (e.g., the Treaty of the Southern African Development 
Community). This study assessed how the mandate of international law to involve local 
communities in TFCA initiatives has been recognized and/or implemented and identified 
the necessary conditions and institutions needed to insure that it is recognized and/or 
implemented.
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C h a p t e r  1
INTRODUCTION
In areas where it is hard to separate land, wildlife, and communities, it may seem 
that substantial participation from local communities in environmental decision-making 
processes is a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, many pieces of international law1 that 
recognize communities as a stakeholder and encourage community involvement in 
carrying out the law do not clearly define the role of communities in the implementation 
of the agreement. Even if the role of communities is clearly defined, nation-states still 
may not involve them in the implementation process. Transfrontier conservation areas of 
southern Africa provide one such venue to investigate this phenomenon.
Transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs) are ecological areas of protection that 
straddle the boundaries of two or more countries, encompassing one or more protected 
areas, as well as multiple resource areas (South African Govt. Dept, of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism 2002). Transfrontier conservation areas are also known as 
international peace parks (Carroll 1979), transfrontier conservation and development 
areas (PPF 2002), transfrontier parks (PPF 2002), transfrontier nature reserves (Thorsell 
and Harrison 1990), transboundary parks (Kenney 1990), and cross-border parks 
(McNeely 1993), all of which depend on the popular terminology of the time and the 
TFCA’s intended purpose. For example, the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park2 is
1 International law is the body o f  rules and agreements that nation states consider to be binding in their mutual relations.
2 A transfrontierpark is a TFCA where the primary propose is wildlife conservation (South African Govt. Dept, o f Environmental Affairs
and Tourism 2002).
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composed of Kruger National Park of South Africa, Gonarezhou National Park of 
Zimbabwe, and the Limpopo National Park of Mozambique (see Fig. 1).
Zimbabwe
Gonarezhou 
National Park
Limpopo 
National Park
Kruger
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Mozambique
South
Africa
The Great
Limpopo
TFCA
Fig. 1 -  The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park
Upon their establishment, TFCAs are managed as a single ecological province for 
multiple purposes including wildlife conservation, increased biodiversity, restoration of 
wildlife migration routes, economic benefit through eco-tourism, creation of buffer zones 
between countries (particularly those with disputed borders), and as a symbolic gesture of 
peace and re-establishment of societal cross-border relationships. They are, however, no 
panacea for natural resource management. As a relatively young approach to 
international protected area management, TFCAs have experienced difficulties, 
particularly in their interface with local communities. For instance, concerns have been 
raised regarding the legal basis for community involvement, the scale of community
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involvement, and how power is devolved to communities (Metcalfe 1999). The purpose 
of this research is to investigate these concerns in the context of international law.
Communities Defined
For the purposes of this study, a community is defined as a group of people 
residing in the same geographic locality and under the same government. Communities 
are complex and heterogeneous systems composed of individuals differentiated by many 
qualities such as status, political and economic power, religion, social prestige, and 
intentions (Barrow and Murphree 2001). As such, communities will be comprised of 
individuals with differing principles and, in turn, different opinions of how TFCAs 
should be managed. These differences can potentially complicate the process of 
community involvement in TFCA management (Bell 1999). Nevertheless, the role of 
communities in ensuring conservation and sound TFCA management has been 
championed by many (e.g., see Danby 1997, Linde et al. 2001, and Metcalfe 1999). In 
this spirit, international law has recognized the important role communities can play in 
implementing international environmental agreements such as TFCA initiatives.
Transfrontier conservation areas and international law as a basis for community 
involvement
Transfrontier conservation areas are established through multilateral treaties 
between nation-states agreeing to manage the areas for the variety of purposes outlined 
above. These treaties carry the force of international law, which, in theory, binds the 
nation-states to abide by the stipulations of the agreement. One of the stipulations 
outlined in many TFCA agreements in southern Africa is that local communities are to
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play an active role in TFCA management. The inclusion of this stipulation is consistent 
with the objectives of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (the 
Treaty of SADC), a piece of international law observed by virtually all of southern
—  'X •Africa. The Treaty of SADC states that SADC Member States are to cooperate in the 
areas of “natural resources and the environment” and “encourage the people o f the 
Region and their institutions to undertake initiatives to develop economic, social and 
cultural ties across the Region and to participate fully in the implementation of the 
programs and projects of SADC.” [Emphasis added] (Article 21 § 3(e), Article 5 § 2(b)). 
Transfrontier conservation area initiatives are an example of cooperation among Member 
States in the area of natural resources and the environment that strive to develop 
“economic, social, and cultural ties” across the region. Thus, Member States are 
essentially mandated to encourage community involvement in TFCA initiatives. The 
Treaty of SADC further declares that Member States “shall take all necessary steps to 
accord this Treaty the force of national law” and “take all steps to ensure the uniform 
application of this treaty.” (Article 6 § 4 and § 5). Therefore, it becomes international 
and national policy of all Member States to encourage the full involvement of local 
communities in the implementation of TFCA initiatives. It is this principle that shaped 
the four fundamental goals of the study:
1. To determine the legal and cooperative structure for TFCAs within southern 
Africa (e.g., informal vs. formal agreements)4;
2. To assess whether or not the relevant treaties and agreements are viewed by 
participating nation-states as a mandate of international law (e.g., do nation-states 
view the Treaty of SADC as a mandate to encourage community involvement?);
3 Member States are states that have signed the Treaty. Presently, all nation-states in southern Africa participating in TFCA
initiatives are also SADC Member States.
4 Formal agreements are written rules that are considered legally binding.
4
3. To ascertain why these treaties and agreements might not be viewed as a mandate;
4. and, to determine what circumstances would make treaty/agreement formalization 
desirable or undesirable.
Transfrontier conservation areas of southern Africa have pioneered a means of 
large-scale conservation across international boundaries. There have been obstacles, 
though, in their establishment and development, and some of these obstacles relate to the 
role of local communities in their establishment and management. Through this study, a 
better understanding of the complex relationship between TFCAs, international law, and 
community involvement will be gained. This assessment then might serve as both a 
descriptive and prescriptive analysis of the implications of international law for TFCAs 
and provide guidance for the roles and behavior of communities toward TFCAs 
worldwide.
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C h a p t e r  2
FRAMEWORKS OF STUDY
The study of TFCAs and the role of local communities in the context of 
international law is neither rich in history nor elementary. Nevertheless, this chapter is 
designed to provide a basic understanding of TFCAs, local community involvement in 
TFCA initiatives, and international law (as related to community involvement in TFCA 
initiatives). The chapter begins with a brief overview of TFCA history, mechanics of 
establishment, purposes and objectives, and the challenges they face. Next, local 
community involvement in TFCA initiatives is discussed; this discussion includes the 
various roles local communities may have in TFCA initiatives, the motives underlying 
local community involvement, and the principle constraints preventing the realization of 
desired benefits. Following this analysis, the chapter continues with an analysis of relevant 
international law, with particular attention paid to the Treaty of SADC and its resulting 
protocols and policies. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of research 
objectives that were shaped through the literature review. In essence, this chapter lays the 
foundation upon which the remainder of the study is based.
Transfrontier Conservation Areas
While interest in TFCA initiatives has grown exponentially in the past decade, they 
are not entirely a product of contemporary thought. The first protected area to cross 
international boundaries in Africa (and arguably in the world) was Albert National Park,
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established in 1925, between Rwanda and Burundi. The Park was formed by the Belgian 
colonial regime for the purpose of conserving transboundary natural resources (Linde et. al. 
2001). After both countries’ independence in the early 1960’s, the Rwandan portion 
became Parc des Volcans (Volcanoes National Park) and the Urundi portion became 
Virunga National Park (Wilkie et al. 2001). Following these designations, Albert National 
Park ceased to exist and the area was no longer managed as a single unit. While it existed 
for only a few decades, Albert National Park was the forerunner of what would become a 
significant movement in transboundary natural resource cooperation in Africa, particularly 
southern Africa.
On April 7, 1999 the first post-colonial TFCA was established in Africa when 
Botswana and South Africa signed a bilateral agreement creating the Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park. The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, composed of the Kalahari- 
Gemsbok National Park of South Africa and the Gemsbok National Park of Botswana, 
has been a de facto TFCA since 1948, operating through a verbal agreement between the 
South African and Botswanan conservation authorities (National Parks Board -  South 
Africa and Dept, of Wildlife and National Parks -  Botswana 1997). Since the 1999 
establishment of The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, major movements have been 
underway in South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, 
Botswana, Tanzania, and Swaziland to formally establish large TFCAs for a multitude of 
purposes related to natural resource management. Much of the success of the modem 
TFCA movement can be attributed to earnest work and financial support from non­
governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Peace Parks Foundation, World Wildlife
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Fund, World Bank, International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF).
On May 27,1990, the President of the Peace Parks Foundation - Dr. Anton 
Rupert, met with Mozambique’s President Joaquim Chissano to discuss the possibility of 
establishing permanent links between protected areas in southern Mozambique and then- 
adjacent counterparts in South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe (Masterson 1999). 
Rupert’s meeting resulted in Chissano’s request for the World Wildlife Fund of South 
Africa to conduct a feasibility study, which was completed and submitted to the 
government of Mozambique in September of 1991 (Tinley 1991). The complexity of 
establishing these links was soon realized and the Mozambiquan Council of Ministers 
recommended further studies to assess the political, social, economic, and ecological 
dimensions of the potential links (Jones 2001). This particular study, funded by the 
Global Environment Facility, through the World Bank, suggested an important shift away 
from the idea of protected national parks towards more emphasis on multiple use by 
indigenous people and communities (Jones 2001 and PPF 2003). In the latter part of 
1996, when the studies were finalized, it also became evident that there was an increasing 
interest in southern Africa as a tourist destination, and development of TFCA initiatives 
would be integral in creating an economic driving force that would result in new jobs 
(PPF 2003). Following the release of the study, three TFCAs -  Gaza-Kruger- 
Gonarezhou (currently known as the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation and 
Development Area), Lubombo, and Chimanimani -  were recommended for 
establishment. The major TFCA projects currently underway in southern Africa are listed 
in Table 1.
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Transfrontier Conservation Area Participating Nation-states
|Ai-|Ais/Richtersveld Transfrontier 
Conservation Park
South Africa and Namibia
The Great Limpopo Transfrontier 
Park*
South Africa, Mozambique, and 
Zimbabwe
Kgalagadi South Africa and Botswana
Lake Malawi/Nyasa/Niassa 
Transfrontier Conservation Area
Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania
Limpopo/Shashe Transfrontier 
Conservation Area
Botswana, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe
Lubombo Transfrontier Conservation 
Area
South Africa, Mozambique, and 
Swaziland
Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier 
Conservation and Development Area
South Africa and Lesotho
*The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park was formerly known as the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou
Transfrontier Park
Table 1. -  Current Major Transfrontier Conservation Area Projects in 
Southern Africa
Mechanics o f Establishment
Due to the multilateral nature of the initiatives, transfrontier conservation area 
establishment is inherently a complex process. Nevertheless, patterns in actions and events 
leading to the establishment of TFCAs can be observed (Danby 1997, Jones et al. 2001, 
Linde et al. 2001, Metcalfe et. al. 1999, Sing et al. 1999, and Mohammed-Katerere 2001). 
The process has begun with two or more land managing authorities (e.g., South Africa 
National Parks or The Department of Wildlife and National Parks of Botswana) 
establishing a dialogue and informally cooperating on the cross-border management of 
natural resources. Depending on the objectives of the areas, nation-states then decide if
9
they would like to continue to informally cooperate or enter into a formalized agreement 
that provides a framework for substantial cooperation.
Purposes and Objectives o f TFCAs
Transfrontier conservation areas have and are being established for the realization 
of benefits that can be classified as political, ecological, economic, socio-cultural, or a 
combination thereof (see Fig. 2) (Danby 1997 and Fakir 2001). Ideally, TFCAs will 
promote benefits in all four areas. Often, though, this is not the case and TFCAs are 
established primarily for the realization of a smaller subset of benefits (Fakir 2001).
Political benefits were among the first to be recognized by TFCA planners. By 
establishing TFCAs, a greater sense of neighborliness between participating nation-states is 
hoped to be achieved. Transfrontier conservation areas also have been established to ease 
tensions between nation-states in border disputes through the creation of a buffer zone. For 
example, several transboundary parks in Germany and her neighbors were established 
during post-war periods in an attempt to improve border relations (McNeil 1990). 
Establishment of TFCAs also has become a centerpiece of the Central American peace 
process. Here, TFCAs have been described as “icebreakers” whereby more controversial 
border issues are introduced following an agreement upon the establishment of TFCAs as a 
symbol of peace (Weed 1994).
Ecological benefits are among the most frequently cited and may be, along with 
political benefits, considered the primary reason for the establishment of many TFCAs in 
southern Africa. Transfrontier conservation areas, as large protected areas, have been
10
shown to dramatically increase biodiversity and ecological health in comparison to smaller 
protected areas (Diamond 1975 and Katerere et al. 2001). The promotion of ecological
Ecological - natural 
resource and 
environmental 
protection, 
biodiversity, creation 
of larger reserves
Political - promotion of 
peace and improved 
international relations
Socio-cnltmal - preservation 
and/ or restoration of cultural 
integrity, interaction of cross 
border indigenous peoples
Fig. 2 -  Summary of Benefits Associated With TFCA Establishment
health and re-establishment of elephant migration routes was fundamental in creating the 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique (South 
African Government Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2000). 
Additionally, with respect to endangered species, TFCAs have a greater possibility of 
sustaining minimum viable populations - the population large enough to avoid inbreeding 
and withstand losses resulting from environmental processes (Burkey 1995 and Danby 
1997).
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It also has been suggested that indigenous communities will benefit from TFCAs 
(Ramutsindela 2002). National boundaries and lines on maps are a product of colonial 
southern Africa (Omer-Cooper 1997), and prior to the arrival of the Dutch and British in 
the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, indigenous communities lived pastoral and hunter- 
gatherer lifestyles that, in most cases, were void of definitive territorial boundaries 
(Shillington 1993). Where definitive territorial boundaries did exist, they were often 
transected by the provincial demarcation of European colonists (Omer-Cooper 1997). It 
has been proposed that through the creation of TFCAs, many estranged indigenous 
communities will be able to reunite (Reid 2001). Transfrontier conservation areas also 
could help surrounding communities experience improved social security and welfare 
through stronger community-based property rights; improved livelihoods through 
diversified, income-generating, land-use options; and improved collaboration with 
government and private sectors (Metcalfe 1999).
In terms of economic benefits, TFCAs can foster significant growth for participating 
nation-states and local communities through eco-tourism. According to the World Bank, 
tourism is second only to oil in generating the world’s largest income (World Bank 1996). 
Transfrontier conservation areas can prove to be more desirable to tourists than other 
protected areas in that opportunities are expanded and human concentrations are allowed to 
diffuse, which will purportedly lead to “high quality experiences” (Singh 1999). Hamilton 
(1997) notes:
i t  is more cost-effective and satisfying for the tourist to be able to visit 
more than one park from his or her base, and even pay one 
admission fee (e.g., boat trips across the border on Waterton lake for 
Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park; river rafting between 
Kluane/Tatshenshini-Alsek/Glacier Bay crossing three jurisdictions and 
two countries; boat tours down the river border in the bilateral 
Bohemian-Saxonian Switzerland in Germany and the Czech Republic)”
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Other, more consumptive, economic benefits may include increased agriculture, forestry, 
fisheries, hunting, and game farming, all of which are multi-million dollar industries in 
southern Africa (Reid 1994, Singh 1999, and World Bank 1996).
Challenges
While the potential benefits of TFCAs are profound, they have presented many 
challenges to participating governments, land management authorities, and local 
communities, which have both impeded their establishment and provoked skepticism of 
their worth (Fakir 2001 and Weis and Draper 2002). As with the benefits, the apparent 
challenges facing TFCAs are generally social, political, or economic in nature. Challenges 
might manifest before the establishment of a TFCA, following the establishment of a 
TFCA, or both.
Given southern Africa’s colonial history, the relinquishment of a certain level of 
national sovereignty to establish and manage a TFCA has presented political challenges 
(Duffy 1997, Mohammed-Katerere 2001, and Rosenberg and Korsmo 2001). Throughout 
its colonial history, “ownership” of lands in southern Africa was tossed between Britain, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, France, and Germany creating inconsistent governmental 
regimes and institutional practices (Shillington 1993). Post-colonial southern Africa places 
a significant emphasis on maintaining national sovereignty and nation-states are quick to 
protect it. In some cases, the cross-border and collaborative governance of TFCAs has 
been perceived as a threat to national sovereignty (Danby 1997). This challenge is not 
peculiar to southern Africa, though. Political leaders in Central America have expressed a
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hesitancy to promote national parks crossing international borders “for fear that they are 
somehow relinquishing control of national territory” (Arias and Nation-states 1992).
Aside from challenges related to sovereignty, perhaps the most salient political 
challenge facing TFCAs is a lack of effective agreements. “Effective,” as used here, is not 
synonymous with “legally binding,” where “legally binding” implies the presence of 
systems of accountability. All TFCA agreements are considered legally binding under 
international law, but transfrontier conservation area initiatives must also have appropriate 
institutional structures and compatible legislation between participating countries in place 
before they can be considered reasonably effective (Danby 1997, McNeely 1993, and Von 
Malchus 1982).
Unlike the political challenges, the economic challenges faced by TFCAs have 
generally only been experienced following their establishment (Fakir 2001). International 
NGOs have been quick to fund start up costs and initial activities in southern African 
TFCA initiatives; thus, financial cost is not typically a problem until after TFCAs are set 
in place and funding from external sources fades (Richardson 2002 and World Bank 
1996). The poor cost-effectiveness of TFCAs is partly a product of the narrow base upon 
which they depend for income. TFCAs and other protected areas are heavily dependent on 
tourism and eco-tourism as a source of post-NGO revenue (Belsky 1999 and Linde 2001). 
While tourism might, in fact, be the second greatest global source of income, it has long 
been recognized as a fickle and risky industry that experiences tremendous fluctuations 
and is subject to global and national recessions as well as dominant interests of the time 
(World Bank 1996). Such fluctuations can lead to unstable sources of revenue that can 
dramatically affect the sustainability of a TFCA.
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As with political challenges, social challenges can manifest both before and 
following the establishment of TFCAs. However, unlike political and economic 
challenges, social challenges are difficult to identify, due to the fact that they may be a 
result of several factors (including political and economic). For example, issues related to 
the equal sharing and realization of economic benefits among local communities has 
surfaced as a serious threat of an amiable relationship between local communities and 
TFCAs. According to Neumann (2000), African communities tend, in the perception of 
international NGOs dominated by western capital, to be divided into “good” and “bad 
natives,” depending on how primitive they are. The more primitive they are, the “better” 
they are and the more voice they have concerning TFCA issues and the more right they 
have to stay in the area and reap the financial privileges of western donor attention.
While equal sharing and realization of benefits is certainly an important concern 
among communities situated in and around TFCAs, many have argued that the greatest 
threat to local communities and their rights is the failure to establish systems by which 
nation-states protect community interests and involve local communities in the planning 
and management of TFCAs (e.g. Metcalfe 1999, Mohammed-Katerere 2001, Murphree 
1991). As a result, local communities develop resentment and mistrust toward participating 
nation-states and a lost sense of ownership with respect to the areas (Agrawal and Gibson 
1999 and Linde 2001). While many TFCA agreements have recognized the important role 
local communities could play in the implementation of TFCA initiatives, rarely are systems 
of accountability in place that bind nation-states to execute this recognition (Metcalfe 
1999). Notwithstanding international law that requires nation-states to engage in a 
collaborative dialogue with local communities concerning transboundary initiatives such as
15
the establishment of TFCAs (i.e., the Treaty of SADC), follow through is not universal 
(Mohammed-Katerere 2001, and SADC 1992).
It is this interface of TFCAs, the community, and international law that this study 
addressed. However, before examining the dynamics of international law as applied to 
community rights, we first proceed with an examination of the crucial, but often 
questionable and contested, relationship between local communities and TFCAs of southern 
Africa.
Transfrontier Conservation Areas of Southern Africa and Local Communities
The potential benefits of TFCAs to local communities have spawned a close 
examination of the interface between the two. While past research identified 
communities as a hindrance to conservation and preservation ideals, current authors 
herald them as an important venue for implementing wise conservation practices 
(Chambers and McBeth 1992, Chitere 1994, and Etzioni 1996). According to a 1999 
Food and Agriculture Organization survey, more than fifty countries (including many in 
southern Africa) report that they “actively” involve local communities in managing their 
protected areas. Current conservation projects, including TFCA initiatives, are focused 
not only on protecting lands and resources, but also on protecting community rights and 
concerns (Mayoral-Phillips 2002).
The growth of community involvement in conservation projects can be attributed 
to several factors. One factor is that international agencies including the World Bank, 
Worldwide Fund for Nature, Conservation International, the Nature Conservancy, the 
Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and USAID have all directed enormous
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sums of money and effort toward community-based conservation and resource 
management^. A second factor is that in areas where communities are engaged in 
subsistence lifestyles, the capacity of nation-states to coerce their citizens into unpopular 
development and conservation programs that affect the resources upon which they are 
dependent is limited (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). The weakness of state-centric policy in 
this instance leaves few options other than community-based conservation (Weis and 
Brandon 1992). The proliferation of democratic political structures in southern Africa 
also has lead to an increasing demand for community participation, while 
unrepresentative development and conservation projects have become not only 
unattractive, but impractical as well.
An Operating Definition o f Local Communities
Research concerned with the interface of local communities and the environment 
has shown that one of the first challenges is to develop an operational definition of “local 
community” (Berkes 1989). There are several ways that “local community” has been 
defined, and each is appropriate for different interests and research questions (Agrawal 
and Gibson 1999, Barret 1999, Belsky 1999, and Corbet and Jones 2000). In this study, 
local community is defined as a group of people residing in the same locality and under 
the same government. This definition is in contrast to definitions of the local community 
as a homogenous social structure or a group of people having common interests and 
shared norms (e.g., Agrawal 1998). The definition used here is necessary since issues of
5 Community-based conservation and resource management is broadly defined in this study as natural resource management that places a 
special and significant emphasis on community involvement and participation.
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international law and nation-state policy deal with local communities defined by 
territorial boundaries. This definition permits two critical assumptions:
• Communities are complex and heterogeneous systems composed of individuals 
differentiated by many qualities such as status, political and economic power, 
religion, social prestige, and intentions (Chambers and McBeth 1992)
• Local communities may be composed of individuals with differing and, possibly, 
polarized views of TFCAs and their management (Chitere 1994, Etzioni 1996, and 
Metcalfe 1999).
These characteristics may either enable or limit the ability of collaborative management of 
TFCAs to succeed. Provided a diverse representation from the community participates in 
the TFCA planning and management processes, the potential exists that the presentation of 
many viewpoints and perspectives will be presented. Alternatively, community diversity 
can hinder planning and management processes when systems for conflict resolution are 
not in place (Weed 1994).
In addition to the global assumptions regarding local communities, historical factors 
have lead to specific assumptions regarding local communities of southern Africa. For 
example,
• Indigenous peoples were not active participants in the colonial discourse related to 
conservation (Crosby 1986 and Anderson and Grove 1987).
• Nearly all communities have a rich and diverse heritage of indigenous knowledge 
(Metcalfe 1999).
Both of these factors contribute to interesting and sometimes unpredictable responses by 
local communities to TFCA initiatives. Weis and Draper (2002) noted that some local
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communities have perceived TFCA initiatives as a mechanism by which post-colonial 
whites legitimize (vis-a-vis environmental protection) the taking of lands and rights of 
local communities. Despite the complexity of communities and the relationships between 
local communities and surrounding TFCAs, exploration of the challenges and 
opportunities facing local communities and their role in TFCA initiatives has been rare.
The Role o f Local Communities in TFCA Initiatives
The role of local communities in southern African conservation has been marginal 
at best (Anderson and Groves 1987, Crosby 1986, and Omer-Cooper 1997). This has been 
particularly evident in South Africa where, before the fall of the apartheid6 regime in 1994, 
local communities (particularly indigenous ones) had no voice whatsoever in conservation 
practices (Omer-Cooper 1997 and Shillington 1993). Furthermore, British and Dutch 
colonists regularly dislocated indigenous communities to reserves to make way for larger 
plantation style farms and colonial development (Omer-Cooper 1997 and Shillington 
1993). With the fall of apartheid in South Africa and the rise of democracy, indigenous 
communities became more sessile and began to speak with a louder and more influential 
voice in conservation matters. Given that the institutionalization of democracy in South 
Africa and the establishment of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park in 1999 occurred within a 
relatively short period of time, The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park is one of the first 
conservation initiatives in South Africa to actively involve and seek participation from 
local communities.
6 The apartheid government was a legal framework, introduced by Dutch Colonists, which instituted white supremacy and was 
the dominant political ideology in South Africa from 1948-1994.
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The capacity to which community participation occurs and the mechanisms by 
which it occurs varies across TFCAs (Metcalfe 1999). Metcalfe (1999) has identified 3 
mutually exclusive approaches to community involvement in TFCA initiatives: TFCA 
outreach (management for/with local communities), collaborative management 
(management with/by local communities), and community-based management 
(management by local communities). As Barrow and Murphree (2001) suggest, these 
roles can be imagined as a continuum. The three roles identified above are merely points 
along the continuum where a marked change in objectives occurs. The dynamics of each 
approach are quite complex (see Table 2). It should be noted that each approach might be 
appropriate in some places for specific purposes, and each has its own set of opportunities 
and challenges that must be considered before implementation.
As indicated above, each possible role that local communities may play in TFCA 
initiatives has dramatically different implications for the TFCAs themselves. For instance, 
the dominant objective of “TFCA outreach” is “enhanced conservation and integrity of 
protected areas and TFCAs.” This objective may often be sought by TFCA officials with 
little or no involvement of local communities in the decision-making process. On the other 
hand, the principles of “community-based conservation” stipulate that the needs of rural 
livelihoods must be met first, with conservation integrated as an important secondary 
objective. This approach recognizes that where resources for living are insufficient, 
protected area resources might be lost. In the absence of external control, the TFCA is 
maintained only when it is economically or culturally viable.
While “collaborative management” is a middle-ground compromise, it presents a special 
set of challenges. Under collaborative management, planning is done jointly and under the
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assumption that the TFCA will be used for multiple purposes. In the case where TFCA 
officials and local communities share an equivalent level of power, this approach is highly 
conducive to stalemates. Transfrontier conservation area officials might wish to protect 
particular species of flora and fauna, while local communities might wish to harvest or 
extract those same species for subsistence purposes (Danby 1997). With an equivalent 
level of power held between the TFCA officials and local communities, there exists no 
ultimate authority to resolve such a dispute if both parties refuse to compromise.
To resolve this issue, in most situations the traditional role of the community in 
TFCA initiatives is a combination of TFCA outreach and collaborative management where 
collaborative management is practiced unless both parties are locked in an irreconcilable 
dispute, in which case the views and wishes of TFCA officials would trump that of local 
communities (Adams and Hulme 2001, Bell 1999, Ezemvelo Kwa-Zulu-Natal Wildlife 
2001, Griffin et. al. 1999, Kellert et. al. 2000, Metcalfe 1999, and Weis and Draper 2002)
Opportunities for Community Involvement in TFCA Initiatives
The objective of this study was to examine the roles outlined above in the context 
of international law and the legal obligation to actively involve local communities in 
TFCA initiatives. To understand why so many have advocated a legal mandate for 
community involvement, it is first necessary to understand why communities wish to be 
involved in the first place. Without the realization of benefits through either of the roles 
discussed above, there is little incentive for communities to actively participate in TFCA 
initiatives.
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Approach
TFCA Outreach Collaborative
Management
Community-
Based
Conservation
Conservation 
for/with local 
communities
Conservation 
with/by local 
communities
Conservation by 
local communities
Whose agenda
TFCA development 
dominated TFCA 
officials. Local 
communities are 
subsidiary partners to 
achieve TFCA 
conservation 
objectives
TFCA dominated by 
TFCA officials with 
communities slowly 
moving toward some 
joint management 
responsibilities.
Local community as 
legal land entities join 
protected area 
authorities as full and 
equal partners
Dominant
objective
Enhanced 
conservation and 
integrity of protected 
areas and TFCAs
Conservation of 
TFCAs through 
managed access to 
multiple-use 
resources
Rural livelihoods: 
needs met but 
conservation needs to 
be integrated
Ownership/tenure
status
State-owned land and 
resources (e.g. 
national parks, forest 
and game reserves)
State-owned land 
with mechanisms for 
collaborative 
management of 
certain resources 
with the community. 
Complex tenure and 
ownership 
arrangements.
Local resource users 
own land and resources 
either de jure or de 
facto. State may have 
some control of last 
resort.
Who owns the 
process
TFCA officials with 
conditional benefit 
flow to local 
communities.
The state with 
concessions toward 
joint management 
and multiple use
Local community has 
legal rights of control
Who plans
Joint planning only 
on outreach activities
Joint planning of 
multiple-use control
Local community often 
assisted by
advisors/administrators
Who controls TFCA authority Joint authority Community authority 
(democratic/traditional)
Fate o f
conservation
resource
TFCA core 
maintained for 
national heritage and 
benefit, but wider 
TFCA manifests 
land-use conflicts 
and fragmentation
TFCA core 
maintained for 
national heritage. 
Benefits shared with 
local community 
groups and 
individuals. Use 
may not be 
sustainable and 
species may be 
affected.
Where resource is 
insignificant to rural 
economics or culture, it 
may be lost. Resource 
maintained when 
culturally/economically 
viable.
Source: (Metcalfe 1999)
Table 2. Summary of the Roles of Local Communities in TFCA Initiatives
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With that in mind, promoters of TFCAs in southern African have enumerated the benefits 
of TFCAs for local communities. Four principle benefits have been described by 
researchers and policy-makers (Adams and Hulme 2001, Hulme and Inamdar et al. 1999, 
Linde et al. 2001, Murphree 1999, Metcalfe 1999, and PPF 2002):
1. Improved economic health through diversified, income-generating, land-use 
options and eco-tourism
2. Re-establishment of community relationships severed by colonial boundaries
3. Stronger community-based property rights
4. Improved collaboration and relations with governments, businesses, and other 
communities (all of which includes those of other nation-states)
Challenges and Constraints to Community Involvement in TFCA Initiatives
As promising as local community involvement is in TFCA initiatives, the 
challenges it presents are equally foreboding. In a broader context, the challenges facing 
community-based conservation have been widely discussed (e.g. Barret and Arcese 1995, 
Oates 1951, Ite 1996, Noss 1997, and Weis and Draper 2002). As with the benefits 
associated with local community involvement in TFCA initiatives, the challenges and 
constraints preventing the realization of benefits are economic, social, and political in 
nature. Listed below are the primary challenges and constraints7.
Economic challenges arid constraints:
1. Economic viability of TFCAs
2. Equity in disbursement of benefits and costs
Social challenges and constraints:
3. Capacity of communities to effectively participate in TFCA decisions
4. Conflicts between cultural heritage and conservation priorities
5. Apathy of local community members toward participation
7 Metcalfe (1999), Mohammed-Katerere (2001), and Weis and Diaper (2002) give a more complete treatment o f challenges and 
constraints related to communities and TFCAs
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Political challenges and constraints:
6. Tense relationships between stakeholders
7. Inadequate systems of conflict resolution
8. Questionable community property rights
9. Complexity of TFCA initiatives
10. Lack of international law implementation regarding local community participation 
in TFCA initiatives
While arguments for local community involvement in TFCA initiatives are important 
and relevant, current evidence suggests that the reality may fall short of the rhetoric and 
promise decreed by framers of TFCA initiatives (Linde et al. 2001, Sandwith 2001, Singh 
1999, Weis and Draper 2002, and Westing 1998). Compounding the difficulty in enabling 
local communities to realize the benefits associated with TFCA initiatives, solutions for 
community participation might be as complex as the problems themselves (Metcalfe 1999). 
For instance, a fundamental challenge facing local communities is that nation-states may 
choose to ignore the mandate of international law to encourage community involvement in 
TFCA initiatives. Such a challenge exacerbates problems surrounding protection of 
sovereignty, state accountability, and the power of international law.
Transfrontier Conservation Areas, Local Communities, and International Law
Transfrontier conservation areas of southern Africa present land managers, 
government officials, and local communities with unique challenges, particularly within 
the realm of international law. While domestic protected areas are governed by the laws 
and regulations of one nation-state, TFCAs are governed by multiple nation-states. The 
multilateral nature of TFCA initiatives challenges fundamental principles of international
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law such as nation-state sovereignty, nation-state responsibility, and good neighborliness 
(Singh 1999).
One aspect of good neighborliness is the mutual observance of treaties by 
participating nation-states. Observance of treaties is important to local communities 
because virtually all nation-states in southern Africa are mandated by international law, 
vis-a-vis the Treaty of SADC, to actively involve local communities in TFCA initiatives 
(Metcalfe 1999 and Mohammed-Katerere 2001). However, in some &ses, nation-states 
have either chosen to not implement or have simply failed to recognize the mandate. The 
Kgalagadi Transffontier Park has been well documented for its lack of involvement and 
consultation with local San communities (Mayoral-Phillips 2002). Conversely, nation­
states may implement the mandate of community involvement, but the involvement may 
not be to the extent to which international law mandates. In either case, communities are 
marginalized when nation-states fail to recognize the binding responsibilities outlined in 
international law (Metcalfe 1999). An assessment of the interface between international 
law, local communities, and TFCAs is needed to insure current concerns are addressed 
and to serve as a guide for future regional policy related to TFCAs.
The Foundation o f International Law
International law is the body of rules that nation-states consider to be binding in 
their mutual relations (Slomanson 2003). It is a construct of norms, standards, principles, 
institutions, and procedures of a “society” that is composed not of individual human 
beings, but of sovereign nation-states (Henkin 1989). On account of the sovereignty of 
nation-states, the observance of international law is dependent on the consent of nation­
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states and is a law of coordination rather than subordination. Absent state consent then, a 
supposed rule of international law is not binding to that particular state. In essence, 
international law is a “voluntary” legal system where the governed govern in order to 
preserve the integrity of their respective sovereignties (Slomanson 2003).
The sources of international law have been heavily debated; nevertheless, the 
international community has agreed to the following list of sources for establishing the
o
corpus of international law . According to Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice9:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nation-states;
d. ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nation-states, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law.
Scholars have interpreted this list as implying six major sources of international law: (1) 
treaties, (2) custom, (3) general principles, (4) judicial decisions, (5) scholarly writings, 
and (6) UN resolutions. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the ordered listing of 
these sources reflects a hierarchy among sources, treaties and customs being the most 
important sources, while scholarly writings and UN resolutions are of least importance
8 While the completeness o f  this list has been debated (see, e.g., Brownlie 1998; Brierly 1976), the UN Secretary General
heralded this list as a building block o f international law, which has been considered definitive by various international 
arbitral tribunals (UN 1949).
9 The International Court o f Justice is the U N ’s judicial branch.
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(Brownlie 1998; Slomanson 2003). Of particular importance to TFCAs in southern 
Africa are the first three.
Treaties
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declared that a treaty is
"an international agreement concluded between States in written form 
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its 
particular designation.”10
Treaties are fundamentally the most convenient and effective way of securing 
and identifying international law (Brownlie 1998). They serve as direct proof of the 
rights and responsibilities that parties to the treaty have accepted and are the 
fundamental source of international law (Bodansky 1995).
Treaties can be classified in a number of different ways. First, they are either 
oral or written; while most treaties are written, oral treaties can be just as binding (see,
e.g., Denmark v. Norway 1933). Secondly, they can be classified as unilateral, bilateral, 
or multilateral. Unilateral treaties are agreements where a nation-state imposes 
responsibilities on another nation-state without assuming any rights or obligations of its 
own (e.g., some treaties that occur as a result of war). Bilateral treaties, on the other 
hand, are agreements between two nation-states where mutual rights and obligations are 
established. In this instance, both participating nation-states assume responsibility and 
accountability for the terms of the treaty. Multilateral treaties are similar in principle to 
bilateral treaties, but they involve three or more participating nation-states rather than 
two. Next, treaties can be classified as either lawmaking or contractual. A lawmaking
10 Modem international law has also recognized oral agreements as binding treaties (Cassese 2002).
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treaty creates a new rule of international law designed to replace or modify existing 
nation-state practices (Slomanson 2003). For example, the Treaty of SADC asserts 
many new practices concerning natural resources in southern Africa, such as a binding 
mandate for transboundary cooperation. Contractual treaties merely set forth the terms 
of a contract to which participating nation states agree (Brownlie 1998). This might 
include import-export taxes and tariffs (e.g. the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade). Finally, a treaty is classified as either self-executing or as a declaration of intent. 
Self-executing treaties expressly impose immediate obligations upon a nation-state and 
require no further action to impose these obligations (Slomanson 2003). Alternatively 
nation-states might enter into a declaration o f intent, which would contain general 
principles that require actions by each nation-state’s legislative and/or executive branch 
to fully implement the treaty (Slomanson 2003).
A necessary first step in the analysis of a treaty is to differentiate between 
implementation, compliance, and effectiveness (Weiss and Jacobson 1999). 
Implementation, which occurs after ratification11 by participating nation-states, refers to 
the mechanisms by which nation-states enact and incorporate international agreements 
into their domestic law (Weiss and Jacobson 1999). Implementation can then be further 
analyzed with respect to the method o f implementation and the avenue o f implementation. 
The avenue o f implementation refers to the legal mechanisms by which provisions of 
international law are implemented. Figure 3 displays the avenues of implementation over 
which this study is concerned. They can be described as follows:
11 Ratification is the process by which nation-states consult public opinion, debate the conditions of the treaty in a domestic 
governmental setting, and publidy adopt the provisions o f  the treaty. Generally, while states might sign a treaty, it does not 
enter into force until it has been ratified.
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• The International Law/Nation-State Policies/Community-Policies/ Community 
Members implementation (solid line) -  This avenue of implementation occurs when 
international law concerning communities grants authority to the nation-state to 
draft policies which, in turn, grants local communities authority to draft policy 
which implements the international law in question.
• The International Law/Nation-State Policies/Community Members implementation 
(dashed line) -  This avenue of implementation occurs when international law 
concerning communities grants authority to the nation state to draft policies that 
implement the international law in question.
• The International Law/Community Members interaction (dotted line) -  This avenue 
of implementation occurs when International Law is self-implementing.
International Law
^  Community MembersNation-State Policies
Community Policies'
Fig. 3 -  Avenues of Policy Implementation Relevant to this Study
The method o f implementation refers to the means by which objectives of treaties 
are implemented. To illustrate, consider the Treaty of SADC’s mandate for community 
involvement in TFCA initiatives. The avenue of implementation may involve nation-states
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recognizing the mandate for community involvement and then developing binding 
national policies that require collaboration between land managing agencies, such as South 
Africa National Parks, and local communities. With respect to the method of 
implementation, South Africa National Parks may engage in community-based 
conservation projects with local communities and actively promote participation of local 
community members in planning and management committees.
Compliance, the second component of treaty analysis, goes beyond 
implementation and refers to a nation-states’ adherence to the guidelines and provisions 
instituted by a treaty (Weiss 1999). Several factors, which might be economic, socio­
cultural, or political in nature, influence a nation-state’s compliance with a treaty 
(Flaherty 1999). Weiss and Jacobson (1999) note that nation-states are in different 
positions on two dimensions when they enter into an agreement: the intention to comply 
and the capacity to comply. It has been widely noted that many developing nation­
states, such as those found in southern Africa, intend to comply with treaties, but they 
may lack the capacity to comply (e.g., see Clapham 1996 and Cleaver 2001). Nation­
states may often not have the capacity to comply due to inadequate resources such as 
funding, personnel, or appropriate institutions in place to carry out treaty provisions 
(Mastny and French 2002).
Ultimately, the success of a treaty is measured by its effectiveness. Effectiveness 
refers to whether or not the objectives of a treaty have been or are being achieved (Weiss 
and Jacobson 1999). It is important to note that compliance does not necessarily imply 
effectiveness. This may often be the case with respect to community involvement in 
TFCA initiatives (Metcalfe 1999). For example, nation-states may implement and
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comply with the provisions of the Treaty of SADC, which require community 
involvement in TFCA initiatives, by opening planning and management meetings to 
local community members; however, if no one from the local community attends the 
meetings, then the Treaty has not been effective in actively engaging community 
involvement. Implementation and compliance are merely a means to an end, that end 
being treaty effectiveness.
Customary International Law
As Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice suggests, 
treaties are only one source of international law. International law can also be found in 
custom, general principles, judicial decisions, scholarly writings, and UN resolutions. 
Aside from treaties, the primary source of international environmental law is custom 
(Victor 1999). According to the standard account, customary international law is the 
empirical manifestation of the ways in which states consistently and uniformly behave 
{Columbia v. Peru 1950). The challenge of customary international law is to figure out 
what constitutes “consistent and uniform behavior among states.” Brownlie (1998) posits 
four elements for determining whether or not such a behavior is customary international 
law: (1) duration of behavior, (2) substantial uniformity and consistency in behavior 
among all affected states, (3) generality of practice, and (4) international consensus 
about, and recognition of the particular behavior as binding. For instance, the prevention 
of transboundary harm (e.g., transboundary pollution) is considered to be a precautionary 
example of customary international law (Mohammed-Katerere 2001).
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Customary international law may also manifest through multilateral treaties. In 
general, treaties bind only those nation-states that are parties to the treaty; however, if a 
sufficient number of nation-states are parties to a multilateral treaty, then that may serve 
as evidence of a “consistent and uniform behavior.” (Carr and Scott 1999). Carr and 
Scott (1999) argue that there are three criteria that must be met that would enable a 
multilateral treaty to be considered customary law:
1. A sufficient number of nation-states in the international system accept the treaty.
2. A significant number of those states whose interests are substantially affected by 
the treaty are parties to the treaty.
3. The treaty does not allow reservations on the part of the treaty (i.e. any provision 
that a party to the treaty can treat as not applying to itself can hardly become 
customary international law that obligates states which do not have a similar 
opportunity to reject).
It is important to note that multilateral treaties manifesting customary 
international law are both global and regional in scope (Devine 1994). In the case of 
regional multilateral treaties, the first criterion would read “A sufficient number of 
nation-states in the regional international system accept the treaty.” Provided the other 
two criteria are met, a regional multilateral treaty would manifest customary international 
law specific to that particular region. For example, suppose all but one nation-state in 
sub-Saharan Africa is a party to a particular agreement; then, provided the above criteria 
are met, the non-participating nation-state could be bound by the treaty, despite it not 
being a signatory.
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Determining what constitutes customary international law is inherently difficult 
due to the imprecise nature of the above conditions (Car and Scott 1999 and Goldsmith 
and Posner 1999). How many nation-states are needed to constitute an international 
consensus? What makes the practice of a behavior “general”? How long must a behavior 
have occurred before it can be considered custom? The rampant ambiguity makes it much 
easier for nation-states to ignore customary international law. As Bodansky (1995) 
argues, the principal importance of customary international law rests not in its ability to 
legally resolve disputes, but to set the terms of international discussions and serve as a 
framework for negotiations and treaties.
Regionalism in southern Africa
Regionalism refers to the consenting regional organization of nation-states where 
the primary objective of such organization is to foster nation-state integration and 
cooperation (Robson 1993). Integration, whether social, political, or economic in nature, 
is solidified by nation-states signing and ratifying treaties that contain provisions 
promoting integration. The European Union is a an example of regionalism where 
European nation-states have agreed to integrate economically by accepting a uniform 
currency, the Euro, and to integrate politically by conferring and cooperating with one 
another to create a uniform political voice in international matters (e.g., the international 
opinion of the European Union in response to the United States-Iraq conflicts of the early 
21st century). Like Europe, southern Africa is no stranger to regionalism. The Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) and SADC are modem attempts at regionalism where 
nation-states integrate politically, socially, and economically. The regionalism efforts of
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SADC are especially relevant to TFCA initiatives and serve as an example of southern 
Africa’s attempt to regionalize and integrate in an environmental context.
While many consider regionalism in southern Africa to be a noble goal, it is not 
without challenges (e.g., see Tlou 1997 and Gibb 1997). Challenges to regionalism can 
include discordant cultures of participating nation-states, which might lead to an inability 
to communicate effectively and understand the circumstances surrounding other 
participating nation-states’ positions on particular matters. Challenges might also include 
dissonant long-term goals, which could result in conflicting perceptions of direction of 
the organization.
Inequity among participating nation-states, which can be economic or political in 
nature, is also a limiting factor to the success of regionalism. This is of particular 
importance to nation-states in southern Africa. For example, the South African 
component of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park -  Kruger National Park -  is one of 
the most popular protected areas in the world and is visited by a considerably larger 
number of tourists than the parks of Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Duffy 1997). The 
result is that South Africa reaps a larger share of the economic benefits associated with 
the TFCA than Mozambique or Zimbabwe (Fakir 2001). Other examples of regional 
inequity are pandemic, but it is this challenge that provides the greatest threat to 
successful regionalism in southern Africa (Tlou 1997).
The Treaty o f SADC and the Mandate to Involve Local Communities in TFCA Initiatives
The Southern African Development Community is a culmination of regionalism 
movements that called for solidarity and independence for peoples of African descent
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(Padmore 1949 and Clapham 1996). The underlying premise of the movements was that 
unity would insure real independence from colonial and neo-colonial forces in Africa 
(Omer-Cooper 1994 and Clapham 1996). The Southern African Development Community 
has formally stated that “[its] ultimate objective is to build a region in which there will be a 
high degree of harmonization and rationalization to enable the pooling of resources to 
achieve collective self-reliance in order to improve the living standards of the people of the 
region” (SADC 2003).
The provisions of the Treaty are carried out through various protocols and policies 
drafted by SADC, which are then signed and ratified by the Member States. The protocols 
and policies of SADC reflect the general concerns shared by the Member States and offer 
more specific direction and guidelines for cooperation than what is set forth in the Treaty. 
For instance, there are policies and protocols addressing tourism, energy, trade, drug 
trafficking, and wildlife conservation. The importance of the protocols is addressed in 
Article 22 of the Treaty: “each protocol shall be approved by [the Heads of State or 
Government] and shall thereafter become an integral part of this Treaty” [emphasis added]. 
A recurring theme in SADC protocols and policies is that SADC is particularly interested 
in accomplishing its objectives while fostering community participation in the process. In 
fact, not only is the participation of communities encouraged, but, in many cases, it is 
mandated.
Article 5 sections 1(g) and 2(b) of the Treaty form the foundation for the mandate 
to encourage community involvement in TFCA initiatives: “the sustainable utilization of 
natural resources and effective protection of the environment” is an objective of SADC 
which, in addition to other means, shall be achieved by “encourag[ing] the people of the
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Region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop economic, social, and cultural ties 
across the Region, and to participate fully in the implementation o f the programmes and 
projects o f SADC’ [emphasis added]. According to Article 4(f) of the Protocol on Wildlife 
Conservation and Law Enforcement, a specific objective of the protocol is to “promote the 
conservation of shared wildlife resources through the establishment of transfrontier 
conservation areas” [emphasis added]. Thus, TFCA initiatives are to be considered a 
legitimate program or project of SADC, and, hence, the people of the region (i.e., local 
communities) and their institutions are to participate fully in the implementation of TFCA 
initiatives.
The failure of nation-states to recognize this mandate is not without consequence. 
Article 6 sections 4 and 5 suggest that Member States are to accord this Treaty as having 
the force of not only international law, but of national law, as well. Furthermore, Article 
33 of the Treaty states that sanctions may be imposed against nation-states who fail to 
recognize this and repeatedly fail to meet the objectives and obligations assumed under the 
Treaty.
While Member States might sign a treaty, it does not imply that they will comply 
with, implement, or achieve its objectives. International law is fraught with examples of 
treaties that are routinely ignored by participating nation-states. The Treaty of SADC has 
proven to be such an example for a number of reasons. First, while the Treaty is strong in 
developmental integration, it is weak in the area of economic integration, which has led to a 
general expression of apathy towards the Treaty by many members of SADC (Clapham 
1996, Holland 1995, and Tlou 1997). As with the European Union, economic integration 
truly solidifies regionalism and is a necessary condition to insure the uniform recognition
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and acceptance of the Treaty as a whole (Holland 1995). Secondly, many Member States 
simply do not have the resources (financial or human) to carry out the objectives of the 
Treaty (Boyle 2001, Cummings 2001, and Mohammed-Katerere 2001). Non­
governmental organizations such as the World Bank and World Wildlife Fund have 
contributed substantially to the start-up costs of SADC sanctioned projects and programs, 
but the long-term financial support needed to maintain them is unstable at best (Fakir 2001 
and Weis and Draper 2002). Thirdly, when South Africa joined SADC in 1994, following 
the fall of apartheid, the balance of power shifted tremendously toward the newly 
democratized state (Worden 2000). South Africa’s status makes it somewhat difficult for 
the Community to engage in intensely conflictual debates with the region’s economic 
hegemon (Tlou 1997). Finally, Member States must address issues surrounding 
sovereignty and equity. By doing so, the remaining challenges could be abated to a certain 
extent (Clapham 1996). Economic integration, for instance, cannot truly exist until nation­
states become secure in their sovereignty and yield to cooperation in the areas of trade and 
standardization of economic practices (Page 1999). Member States must be viewed as 
equal partners in integration despite the economic superiority of some nation-states (e.g. 
South Africa) over others (e.g. Namibia). While SADC certainly faces formidable 
challenges concerning the implementation of its objectives, it remains the most successful 
regional program in southern Africa (Tlou 1997) and carries the force, responsibility, and 
accountability associated with international law.
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The African Union
While SADC might currently be the most successful attempt at regionalism in 
southern Africa, some have heralded the African Union (AU) as the true mechanism to 
bring about an “African Renaissance” (Schoeman 2002). The African Union, established 
in 2002, grew from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963 to unite 
the nation-states of Africa against colonial subjugation and racism and promote 
cooperation that would improve the lives of African people (OAU 1963). By its fiftieth 
anniversary, OAU had virtually accomplished its goal of eradicating colonization in 
Africa. Nevertheless, the organization was seen as having failed to respond to serious 
intra-African conflicts and economic crises plaguing much of the continent (Packer and 
Rukare 2002). Recognizing that the contemporary challenges facing Africa could not 
be addressed by OAU, the AU was formed to economically integrate Africa through a 
common market and to provide the continent with a unified voice in international matters 
(Udombana 2002). Draft protocols have been circulated outlining the establishment of a 
Pan-African Parliament, a African Court of Justice, and three financial institutions 
(consisting of the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, and the African 
Investment Bank) (Packer and Rukare 2002). At present, though, the AU resembles little 
more than an empty shell whose organs and institutions must be further specified and 
defined. This is to be done through protocols that, in most cases, have not been drafted, 
let alone adopted. The diversity of nation-states in Africa and the weak African economy 
provide critical challenges to the effectiveness of the AU, but the organization provides 
guidance as to how Africa envisages its future (Schoeman 2002).
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Considering the AU’s potential as a highly influential international organization, 
policies related to community participation in conservation efforts, such as TFCA 
initiatives, will be pivotal. The African Union is still young and has yet to formulate 
definitive policies related to community involvement in conservation efforts. However, 
given the growing importance of TFCA initiatives in southern Africa, such policies are 
inevitable. Lessons learned from SADC and its policies toward community involvement 
in TFCA initiatives could prove to be invaluable to the framers of an AU policy.
Indigenous Peoples in International Law
One of the shared norms driving regionalism in southern Africa is the protection 
of indigenous peoples’ and communities’ rights. Historically, states have been the only 
entities directly affected by international law. In the past few decades, though, the scope 
of international law has broadened to include the consideration of indigenous peoples’ 
rights. The foundation for the recognition of human rights in international law can be 
found in the United Nation-states Charter, adopted on June 26,1945, which established 
among the organization’s purpose the promotion of “equal rights and self-determination
i *yof peoples.” The promulgation of this objective marked a distinct shift from the
European-centered international law that fostered colonialism and considered it to be a 
mechanism by which indigenous peoples were protected (Anaya 2000). While there was 
a shift in certain objectives of international law, many years followed before the 
objectives were effectuated in southern Africa. For instance, the apartheid regime of 
South Africa remained in power until nearly 50 years after the adoption of the UN
12 Self-determination is identified as a universe o f human rights precepts concerned broadly with peoples, including indigenous 
peoples, and grounded in the idea that all are equally entitled to control their own destinies (Scott 1996).
39
Charter. As illustrated by the fall of the apartheid regime, the contemporary treatment of 
indigenous peoples and communities has been substantially driven by indigenous peoples 
themselves (Peang-Meth 2002).
The past few decades has produced numerous conventions and international 
agreements that seek to recognize the legitimacy of indigenous peoples’ and 
communities’ rights and to redress injustices incurred by colonization. Some of the more 
prominent conventions and agreements include the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (1981), the United Nation-states Conference on Environmental 
Development (1992), the Rio Declaration and the more detailed environmental policy 
statement known as Agenda 21 (1992), the Treaty of SADC (1992), and the Draft United 
Nation-states Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1993) (for a more detailed 
treatment of conventions and agreements regarding indigenous peoples’ rights, see Anaya 
2000). All of the above conventions and agreements acknowledge a moral and legal 
obligation to insure the self-determination of indigenous peoples and communities, which 
includes their participation and consultation in matters directly affecting them. Given the 
broad acceptance of such principles, self-determination is widely acknowledged as a 
principle of customary international law (Anaya 2000, Perret 1998, and Slomanson 
2003). Notwithstanding its status as law, self-determination of indigenous peoples is 
often not observed by nation-states in the absence of a binding treaty (Peang-Meth 2002 
and Scott 1996). This amplifies the importance of including provisions in treaties that 
acknowledge the self-determination of indigenous peoples and their communities. 
Considering southern Africa’s history of colonization and marginalization, nation-states 
in the region have intransigently incorporated the principle of self-determination into
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many regional treaties concerning the environment and development, the Treaty of 
SADC being one such example.
The Framework o f Self-Determination
Rights afforded to indigenous peoples and their communities, including those 
found in the Treaty of SADC, are typically done so under a framework of self- 
determination. Self-determination “entails a universe of human rights precepts extending 
from core values of freedom and equality and applying in favor of human beings in 
relation to the institutions of government under which they live.” (Anaya 2000). As a 
corollary, the self-determination framework further acknowledges that indigenous 
peoples are entitled to control their own destinies and participate in projects, programs, 
and initiatives which might directly and indirectly affect them (Scott 1996). This 
normative framework is widely recognized as being within the corpus of customary 
international law and has been incorporated into numerous treaties, conventions, and 
agreements.
The self-determination framework consists of two normative strains: the 
constitutive aspect and the ongoing aspect. The constitutive aspect requires that the 
creation of the governing institutional body be substantially guided by the will of the 
people, or peoples, governed. The ongoing aspect requires that the governing 
institutional body be one under which people may live and develop freely on a 
continuous basis. (Anaya 2000, Kingsbury 1998, Lynch 1996, Peang-Meth 2002, Perret 
1998, and Scott 1996)
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When institutions are bom or merged with others, when their constitutions are 
altered, or when they endeavor to extend the scope of their authority, they are within the 
sphere of constitutive self-determination (Anaya 2000). Constitutive self-determination 
does not dictate the outcome of such phenomena; rather, it imposes requirements of 
participation, consultation, and consent of indigenous peoples. The violation of this 
principle lead to the international illegitimacy of colonization, which represented 
impermissible territorial expansion of governmental authorities (due to a lack of 
indigenous consent) (Peang-Meth 2002). In the context of TFCAs of southern Africa, 
constitutive self-determination mandates the involvement and consent of local 
communities in the establishment and institution of TFCAs.
Ongoing self-determination continually enjoins the governing institutional body 
to maintain a dialogue with indigenous communities (Perret 1998). In essence, it requires 
a governing body to make thoughtful and meaningful choices in all matters concerned 
with indigenous peoples and their communities (Anaya 2000 and Kingsbury 1998). 
Furthermore, this necessarily requires continual participation, consultation and consent in 
decision-making processes with which indigenous peoples are concerned (Lynch 1996). 
As identified in the UN Friendly Relations Declaration (1970), indigenous peoples are to 
“freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
Functioning self-determination requires at least five minimum conditions (Anaya 
2000, Mohammed-Katerere 2001, and Scott 1996):
• Nondiscrimination -  the UN Charter provides for “respect of human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.”
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• Respect for cultural integrity -  indigenous peoples reserve the right to maintain 
and freely develop their cultural identity in coexistence with other sectors of 
humanity.
• Recognition of land and natural resource rights -  according to the International 
Labour Organization Convention Number 169, “governments shall respect the 
special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned 
of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both, as applicable, which they 
occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this 
relationship.” The convention adds that indigenous peoples “shall not be removed 
from the lands which they occupy” unless under prescribed conditions where 
necessary as an “exceptional measure.”
• The right to social welfare and development -  the UN Charter promulgates that 
governments shall promote economic and social progress and development 
among indigenous peoples.
• Self government -  as the overarching political dimension of ongoing self- 
determination, self-government consists of the idea that government is to function 
according to the will of the people governed.
These normative precepts are necessary conditions to insure the self-determination of 
indigenous peoples and provide indicators as to the health of functioning systems of self- 
determination (Anaya 2000, Kingsbury 1998, and Peang-Meth 2002).
International agreements in southern Africa, such as the Treaty of SADC and the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, have taken great strides to insure that constitutive 
and ongoing self-determination are recognized as objectives of the agreements.
However, for a number of reasons, the objectives may not be complied with, 
implemented, or effectuated, creating feelings of distrust and cynicism, toward the 
nation-state, among indigenous communities. Transfrontier conservation area initiatives 
of southern Africa provide an excellent venue through which the interface of international 
law and local indigenous communities can be assessed, under the framework of self- 
determination. Through this assessment, emerging attempts at regionalism, such as the
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AU, might recognize the legal obligation to facilitate self-determination of indigenous 
communities in TFCA initiatives and endeavor to promote it as an objective of regional 
integration.
Research Objectives
Despite the widely shared norms and beliefs, such as self-determination outlined 
above, there has been a relatively small amount of research dedicated to investigating the 
disconnect between codifying these values into law and then implementing the law. This 
is particularly true in the case of TFCAs in southern Africa where, according to the 
Treaty of SADC, nation-states are mandated to encourage community involvement in 
TFCA initiatives. Prior to this research, studies had not been conducted to assess whether 
or not nation-states actually view this provision as a mandate of international law. 
Furthermore, in the context of the existing literature, the motivations for nation-states’ 
formalization (or lack thereof) of international law and agreements related to TFCAs is 
not clear. These apparent gaps in research shaped the four fundamental objectives of this 
study:
1. To determine the legal and cooperative structure for TFCAs within southern 
Africa (e.g., informal vs. formal agreements);
2. To assess whether or not the relevant treaties and agreements are viewed by 
participating nation-states as a mandate of international law (e.g., do nation-states 
view the Treaty of SADC as a mandate to encourage community involvement?);
3. To ascertain why these treaties and agreements might not be viewed as a mandate;
4. and, to determine what circumstances would make treaty/agreement formalization 
desirable or undesirable.
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Transfrontier conservation areas will continue to be an important venue for 
bioregionalism and conservation initiatives throughout southern Africa and the world. 
Given their importance, it’s imperative to understand the mechanisms by which 
management decisions and policy are made. International law is an important component 
of this understanding since, as international entities, TFCA policy are or could be 
significantly shaped by agreements between participating nation-states. The following 
chapter illustrates how the four objectives listed above were operationalized to 
adequately investigate TFCAs, international law, and their implications for community 
involvement within southern Africa.
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C h a p t e r  3 
METHODS OF STUDY
This investigation assessed the complex interface between international law, 
TFCAs, and local communities in two settings: Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (KTP) and 
the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area (MDTCDA). 
Each study site was chosen on the basis of four principles:
1. Length of establishment
2. Objectives and purpose of the TFCA
3. Political stability of participating nation-states
4. Availability of data and sources of information.
These TFCAs were chosen based on their differences in the first two principles listed 
above, thus providing a more thorough examination. The fulfillment of the last two 
insured safety in gathering data and the thoroughness of the research.
The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park has been a de facto TFCA since 1948, while 
MDTCDA was established in 2001. The objectives and purposes of KTP are geared 
towards protection of the land and resources, whereas the objectives and purposes of 
MDTCDA promote agriculture, settlement, and development in addition to land and 
resource protection. Differences such as these were designed to provide keen insight into 
how adherence to international law may be affected by variables such as length of 
establishment and the objectives and purposes of TFCAs. In the interest of safety, 
political stability was also considered in the selection process. For example, due to the 
political instability of Zimbabwe and the impending danger of entering the country, the
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Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park was not selected as a study site. South Africa, 
Botswana, and Lesotho are all relatively stable and provided a safe environment for 
research. Finally, KTP and MDTCDA were selected partially on the basis that the 
University of Montana has well-established relationships with individuals involved in 
both TFCAs. These relationships promoted a richer study of the issue and helped foster 
relationships with other contacts.
The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park
Situated in the sparsely populated Kalahari Desert of southwest Botswana and 
north-central South Africa, the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (see Fig. 4) is composed of 
South Africa’s Kalahari-Gemsbok National Park (9,591 km ) and Botswana’s Gemsbok
9 #National Park (28,400 km ). The Park is a harsh environment that is home to species of 
plants that must withstand up to ten months of drought. Despite the arid conditions, 
wildlife flourishes in the area. Antelope such as the eland, gemsbok, hartebeest, 
steenbok, and duiker all manage well without a large quantity of water. Large game 
animals such as lion, hyena, and jackals also call this Park home. However, wildlife 
often roam far distances in search of food and water. Inevitably, this has frequently 
required wildlife to roam across the South African and Botswanan borders. Recognizing 
this, land management agencies from South Africa and Botswana acknowledged the need 
to collaborate in management and work cooperatively to ensure that the Kalahari Desert 
and its natural resources were adequately protected.
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Figure 4 -  The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park
In 1948, the governments of Botswana and South Africa informally agreed to 
collaborate in the management of the two parks. The two parks functioned as a single 
ecological unit where wildlife was allowed to move between the parks without the 
impediment of fences. This agreement was formalized 51 years later in 1999 when South 
Africa and Botswana signed a bilateral agreement establishing the Transfrontier Park. 
Since its formalization, various activities have been undertaken to help insure the 
successful consolidation of the two parks. These activities are outlined in the joint 
management plan and include research, management, communication, tourism 
management and development, problem-animal control, and infrastructure development 
(PPF 2003).
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While several diverse cooperative projects are underway, most are centered on the 
protection and conservation of the land and natural resources. According to its 
management plan, KTP is to be managed in accordance with five principle objectives:
1. To preserve the diversity of organisms indigenous to the southern Kalahari as 
functional elements of the ecosystem, with predators receiving priority.
2. To maintain in particular the ecological processes that characterize the Kalahari 
ecosystem.
3. To provide facilities and opportunities for research and monitoring to further 
understanding of the physical and biological processes of the Kalahari ecosystem.
4. To mitigate the less desirable impacts of existing and potential land-use conflicts 
between the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park and neighboring communities.
5. To realize economic returns from tourism associated with the Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park, while safeguarding its ecological integrity and pristine 
wilderness quality.
(SANP and BDWNP 1997)
While the management plan contains provisions aimed at ensuring that local 
communities will benefit economically, community development and participation in 
Park decisions are not specifically cited as an objective. However, on the South Africa 
side, a recent successful land claim by the indigenous San people has insured that local 
communities will play a vital role in the future of the park. Unfortunately, the 
establishment of national parks in southern Africa was, historically, not always done with 
the intention of protecting and conserving land and natural resources. Rather, parks were 
often established to legitimize the taking of land by colonists from indigenous peoples 
(Omer-Cooper 1997; Shillington 1993). In 1931, shortly after the establishment of the 
Kalahari-Gemsbok, the Khomani San were evicted from the land they occupied within 
the park and were dispersed across other parts of South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia 
After the fall of apartheid in 1994, a new South Africa constitution was written, which 
allowed (and even encouraged) indigenous peoples who were removed from their land by
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colonists to reclaim their land. Accordingly, the Khomani San filed a claim, which was 
awarded in 2002, entitling them to roughly 650 km of the Kalahari-Gemsbok National 
Park and extensive land-use rights in KTP (Chennells 2002).
The most formidable challenges that KTP faces involve its interactions with local 
communities, such as the Khomani San, and their role in the management and planning of 
the Park (PPF 2003). While the management plan does not directly address development 
or community participation, communities have been afforded land-use rights, including 
participation in park decisions and development through other means such as land-claims. 
Additionally, as illustrated in the previous chapter, local communities are also afforded 
participatory rights vis-a-vis the Treaty of SADC. Nevertheless, the role of local 
communities in KTP is not clearly defined, thus magnifying the need for an assessment 
of the role they currently and could potentially have.
The Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area
The Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area 
provides a scenario in stark contrast with KTP. The Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier 
Conservation and Development Area is roughly 5,000 km in size (approximately 13% of 
KTP’s size) and is situated in the Maloti-Drakensberg Mountains of South Africa and 
Lesotho. While KTP is composed of two national parks, MDTCDA is composed of four 
national parks, several nature reserves, and a variety of privately protected areas. Also 
found within the border of MDTCDA are numerous areas slated for development.
The Maloti-Drakensberg Mountains are known for their snowfalls, clear streams, 
and invaluable wetland and riparian areas that provide a significant portion of Lesotho’s
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and South Africa’s water and hydroelectric power. Many of the ecosystems found within 
MDTCDA are unique to the area. The “Roof of Africa,” as it has come to be called, is 
also a World Heritage Site and a proposed Biosphere Reserve. In recognition of the 
unique qualities and characteristics of MDTCDA, the governments of South Africa and 
Lesotho signed a MOU on June 11,2001 promulgating a framework for cooperation 
between the two countries. The objectives of the project are to (World Bank/GEF 2000):
1. conserve the globally significant biodiversity of the Maloti-Drakensberg 
mountains;
2. contribute to community development through income-generation from nature- 
based tourism.
The proposed cooperation between the two countries exists in several areas 
including managing ecological threats, community involvement, conservation planning, 
protected area planning, protected area management, tourism planning, and strengthening 
institutions (Ezemvelo Kwa-Zulu-Natal Wildlife 2001). While many of these areas are 
similar to those of KTP, on the surface, community involvement appears to play a more 
critical and important role in MDTCDA. Communities and conservation staff will jointly 
identify challenges and opportunities with the support of a team of social scientists and 
community extension workers (Sandwith 2003). Additionally, progress has been made in 
South Africa with the appointment of statutory boards for protected areas (Sandwith 
2000). These boards represent sectoral and community interest in nature conservation 
and are appointed through a public nomination process. Vested in the board is the power 
to influence management of protected areas nation-wide (including MDTCDA) and to 
allocate funds that accrue to a community trust from levies imposed on visitors to the 
protected areas. All of these actions and plans could potentially make MDTCDA a
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progressive example of community involvement in TFCA initiatives. The forward 
thought is best summarized in the MOU: “Peace, economic development, and 
environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible.”
Despite the emphasis on community involvement and empowerment, MDTCDA 
faces challenges with respect to local communities. In Lesotho, virtually no investment 
in eco-tourism has been made and there exists critical deficiencies in infrastructure. 
Without proper sharing systems in place, this might lead to inequitable distribution of 
benefits. It is also recognized by the framers of MDTCDA that the local communities are 
often isolated politically and marginalized in terms of infrastructure development. This 
has, in the past, led to weak government interaction and a general distrust for outside 
political entities. Through the initiative, MDTCDA planners hope to strengthen these 
relationships by involving local communities, especially those marginalized in the past, at 
the fundamental level of decision-making.
The Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area 
provides a much different approach to community involvement than KTP. However, 
they both face similar fundamental challenges -  gaining the trust of local communities 
and efficiently involving them in the decision-making process while, at the same time, 
empowering them economically, politically, and socially.
Population Sampled
In order to adequately assess TFCAs and the role of local communities in the 
context of international law, information was gathered from four principle populations:
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national government officials, community officials (including land managers), 
academicians, and NGO officials.
The national government officials relevant to this study included the Ministers of 
Environment (or tourism) for South Africa, Botswana, and Lesotho and officials from 
agencies such as South Africa National Parks and Botswana Department of Wildlife and 
National Parks. Data were gathered from the Ministers to shed light on macro-level 
aspects of TFCAs, local communities, and international law. For example, the Ministers 
(or their staff) were best equipped to answer questions concerning who chooses to 
recognize SADC’s mandates and why they may not recognize it. They also were able to 
provide insight into the institutions or resources that might be helpful in ensuring the 
effectiveness of the mandate. Officials from land management agencies provided data 
based on first hand experience with communities. These agencies have and are engaging 
in active community participation and are well aware of the methods of implementation 
of the mandate and the necessary conditions for cooperative management to take place. 
Academics and NGO officials provided an external voice to the data. While national 
government officials and local community officials might consciously or subconsciously 
express inherent biases, academicians and NGO officials were able to shed light on the 
contextual nuances surrounding TFCAs and local communities from an “observer 
perspective.”
Data Sampling
Due to the relative newness of TFCAs in southern Africa, not all national 
government officials were familiar with TFCAs and their implications for local
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communities. When a researcher is studying a population whose members may not all be
I  -i
suitable informants , or they are difficult to locate, Bernard (2002) argues that the best 
means of sampling is snowball sampling. Snowball sampling is the location of one or 
more key informants who will, in turn, provide the researcher with the names of other 
likely informants. The research of Richardson (1988), Kadushin (1968), and Ostrander 
(1980) are all classic examples of studies conducted using snowball sampling in 
situations similar to that used for research on TFCAs and communities in the context of 
international law.
Snowball sampling is also helpful in situations where informants know all of the 
other informants in a population. In general, this is the case in southern Africa, where 
national government officials that are familiar with TFCA initiatives are familiar with 
one another. However, community officials and leaders are not always able to provide 
the names of other community officials and leaders who were participating or interested 
in TFCA co-management. In this case, knowledgeable national government officials and 
academicians were able to provide the names of valuable community officials and 
leaders.
Snowball sampling is a popular means of sampling, particularly in anthropology 
and sociology (Bernard 2002); however, it is not without its pitfalls. If one is dealing 
with a relatively small population of people who are likely to be in contact with one 
another, then snowball sampling can be effective. In a large population, though, people 
who are well known tend to be on everyone’s list while lesser known, but still important, 
informants are less likely to be mentioned. In larger populations, then, snowball
13 An informant is defined as a member o f the studied population who is capable o f providing the researcher with meaningful 
data.
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sampling is risky since every person does not have the same chance of being included 
(Bernard 2002; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Given the relatively small population being 
sampled and the sophisticated networking of key informants, this challenge was not a 
problem.
Data Collection Techniques
Aside from the analysis of management plans, treaties, and other agreements, the 
primary source of data for this study was tape-recorded interviews. Interviews were 
semi-structured and based on the use of a formalized interview guide. The utility of 
semi-structured interviews is that they maintain a level of formality that promotes 
efficient use of time and collection of relevant data while allowing the interviewee to 
express tangential or corollary thoughts that might also be relevant (Bernard 2002). 
Semi-structured interviewing is the most popular method of interviewing among 
anthropologists and sociologists when the researcher has the opportunity to query the 
interviewee in-person (Glaser and Strauss 1999). Due to the efficient use of time, it also 
works very well in projects where the researcher is interviewing high-level bureaucrats, 
in which case it is often difficult to schedule interviews and scheduled interviews are 
often, by necessity, brief (Bernard 2002). The conditions of this research made semi­
structured interviews the data collection method of choice.
The questions posed during the interview were based on an interview guide that 
centered around the four fundamental objectives of this study:
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1. To determine the legal and cooperative structure for TFCAs within southern 
Africa (e.g., informal vs. formal agreements);
2. To assess whether or not the relevant treaties and agreements are viewed by 
participating nation-states as a mandate of international law (e.g., do nation-states 
view the Treaty of SADC as a mandate to encourage community involvement?);
3. To ascertain why these treaties and agreements might not be viewed as a 
mandate;
4. and, to determine what circumstances would make treaty/agreement 
formalization desirable or undesirable.
Depending on the professional position, familiarity with relevant issues, and 
language proficiency of the respondent being interviewed, the questions below required 
occasional modification or re-phrasing. Nevertheless, the integrity and intent of the 
questions were maintained despite this occasional modification. The interview guide was 
comprised of the following nine questions:
1. How much of the current community involvement in TFCA initiatives can be 
attributed to conscious efforts to implement SADC’s provisions? That is, how 
much of the current community involvement was pre-existing or a result of non- 
intemational law forces?
2. Are agreements governing TFCAs formal or informal? What are the advantages 
and disadvantages of each type?
3. Are adequate systems of accountability established through the agreements?
4. Do nation-states and local communities view SADC’s provisions as a mandate to 
encourage community involvement in TFCA initiatives?
5. Who chooses to recognize (or not to recognize) and/or implement SADC’s 
provisions (e.g., nation-states, national government agencies, or local 
communities)?
6. Why may nation-states choose to not recognize and/or implement SADC’s 
provisions?
7. What institutions or resources are missing which would allow SADC’s provisions 
to be effectuated?
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8. What role do nation-states want SADC to play with respect to TFCAs in southern 
Africa?
9. Given the rising popularity of the African Union (AU), if AU desired to establish 
similar objectives of community involvement in TFCA initiatives, how might 
AU’s methods be different than SADC’s in effectuating those objectives?
This guide was thorough enough to adequately assess TFCAs and the role of the 
community in international law while being brief enough to not inconvenience the 
interviewee.
Data Analyses Used
One of the most effective means of analyzing interviews is through “grounded- 
theory.” The grounded-theory approach, championed by Glaser and Strauss in the late 
1960s, is a set of techniques for (1) identifying categories and concepts that emerge from 
the data, and (2) recognizing relationships between concepts and formulating those 
relationships into substantive and formal theories (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Russell 
2002). Grounded-theory differs from other methods of text analysis, such as content 
analysis, in that it allows hypotheses and theories to emerge rather than only testing a 
priori assumptions. The use of grounded-theory is especially important in studying 
issues that have not been previously studied, as is the case with the proposed research. 
Using content analysis for nascent fields of research fundamentally constrains the theory 
and, often, the a priori assumptions are speculative at best (Glaser and Strauss 1967; 
Strauss and Corbin 1998). This is not to say that, with grounded theory, fundamental 
questions and assumptions are not postulated beforehand. Fundamental questions and 
assumptions are offered beforehand to serve as a guiding framework that sets the bounds
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for the research. Without this framework, the researcher runs the risk of generalized and 
meaningless data. In essence, the value of grounded-theory is that it allows the 
researcher to test fundamental hypotheses while still permitting unforeseen theory to 
emerge.
The first component of the grounded-theory method is identifying categories and
concepts that emerge from the text. The principle behind this identification is
discovering patterns of behavior or thought in a set of texts. This usually begins with
simply reading the texts and underlining or highlighting dominant ideas or themes as one
goes along. The varieties of ideas or themes that are identified are termed categories.
These categories are then briefly named. Bernard (1974) discusses his method for
naming categories or emergent ideas:
“In my study of how ocean scientists interact with people in 
Washington D.C., who are responsible for ocean policy, I kept hearing 
the word ‘brokers.’ Scientists and policy makers alike used this word to 
describe people whom they trusted to act as go-betweens, so ‘broker’ 
became one of the [category names] for my work.”
As the researcher analyzes the texts, inherent properties of the categories will 
emerge. Properties refer to the describing elements of the categories (Glaser and Strauss 
1967). For example, “brokers’ relationship with ocean scientists” and “brokers’ concern 
for the pursuit of oceanic research” might be two properties of the “broker” category 
described above. The establishment of categories and properties allows the researcher to 
develop concepts about the category. Concepts are the conclusions that can be reached 
given a category and its properties (Corbin and Strauss 1998). The critical component 
of grounded-theory is recognizing the relationships among the different concepts and 
formulating theories from those relationships. In the broker example above, a concept
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may be that “brokers” are “concerned with the pursuit of oceanic research” and they 
actively maintain strong working “relationships with ocean scientists.”
Shaping the concepts into substantive and formal theories is the second and final 
component of the grounded-theory method. Substantive and formal theories differ only 
in the degree of generality, but each requires a unique analytic approach. Substantive 
theory is concerned with specific, or empirical, areas of inquiry, whereas formal theory 
is derived from generalizations from classes of substantive theories. The substantive 
area of this research is concerned with the interface between international law and 
communities situated in and around KTP and MDTCDA. The formal portion of the 
research is the implications of this substantive research to the broad field of international 
law. Several substantive areas and cases must be researched before formal theory can be 
established (Bernard 2002). The specific nature of this research does not lend itself to 
generating formal theory, but it can contribute to its formation.
In summary, the systematic approach to analyzing the data gathered for this 
research was as follows:
1. Produce transcripts of interviews and read through the texts.
2. Identify categories and properties that arise.
3. As the categories and properties emerge, formulate concepts and compare them.
4. Think about how the concepts are linked together
5. Use the relations among concepts to build theory, constantly checking the theory 
against the data.
6. Present the results using quotes from interviews that illuminate the theory.
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Grounded theory is a clear departure from the traditional deductive approach of 
hypothesis testing. The method offers the researcher the unique and creative opportunity to 
test fundamental a priori hypotheses and propositions and to generate emergent theory that 
might lead to future research. The clear advantage of grounded-theory research is that, 
with respect to emergent theory, the theoretical hypotheses are tested through the already 
existing data (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Therefore, the researcher does not run the risk of 
having a weakly supported substantive theory. In general substantive theory “can usually 
not be completely refuted by more data or replaced by another theory.” (Glaser and Strauss 
1967) Since the method is so intimately “grounded” in the data, the formulated theories are 
destined to last, despite inevitable modification.
Evolution of data collection method
The nature of grounded theory requires the interviewer to adapt to and 
accommodate emergent categories and concepts. As categories and concepts emerge, 
research questions evolve to further explore them. For instance, throughout the course of 
this research, the interview guide evolved to investigate the notion of formalization to a 
greater extent than was originally planned. While this notion was a fundamental focus 
from the beginning of the research, interviewees reinforced it as the principle category.
The importance of formalization was corroborated in that nearly every emergent concept 
appeared to be related to the idea of agreement formalization.
Granted, the shift of formalization to a primary focus of the study is a fundamental 
one, the substance of the research questions were largely unchanged. The result was, in 
effect, that the findings evolved in a different manner than was anticipated. Rather than
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being a question of community involvement, the research came to be an inquisition into the 
fundamental driving forces behind a nation-states decision to formalize agreements. 
Nevertheless, this paradigm shift substantially informed questions concerning community 
involvement in TFCAs in the context of international law.
The next chapter presents a discussion of research findings that illustrates the 
importance of agreement formalization and its implications for community involvement in 
TFCA initiatives. It also highlights the cooperative and legal structure of TFCAs.
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C h a p t e r  4
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
To better understand transfrontier conservation areas and the role of communities in 
the context of international law, three months of field research (June 2003-August 2003) 
was conducted in southern Africa that entailed interviews with several individuals from 
South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. While challenges were encountered in 
the process of collecting these data, the respondents shed valuable insight into nation-state 
awareness of international law (including the Treaty of SADC), the desire for agreement 
formalization, the Treaty of SADC as a mandate for community involvement in TFCA 
initiatives, and the potential role of SADC and the African Union in TFCA initiatives.
The chapter begins with a brief summary of the principle challenges encountered 
throughout the course of the field research. Following this summary is a discussion of the 
findings, which includes an outline of the concepts, categories, and theories that emerged 
from the data. The variability of findings between the study sites are then presented 
followed by a summary of key findings and insights.
Challenges encountered
In essence, the significant challenges encountered throughout the collection of data 
revolved around the nature of the population itself. For the purposes of this study, the 
population was defined as individuals familiar with the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park or the 
Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area who have
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knowledge of both international law and transfrontier conservation areas. The sample set 
interviewed was chosen through snowball sampling and consisted of directors and staff of 
NGOs, government officials, retired individuals who have played a critical role in the 
establishment of TFCAs within the region, and academics.
Throughout the collection of data, three principle population-based challenges 
emerged:
• small population,
• bias among interviewees, and
• short fieldwork period, which led to the inability of many busy potential 
interviewees to be interviewed.
Small population
Transfrontier conservation is an emerging area of interest; as such, the number of 
individuals with expertise in both TFCAs and international law is small. Given that the 
population was small, though, the sample included a substantial portion of the population, 
as defined above. Notwithstanding a representative data set, the size of the population 
prevented saturation of the data itself14.
Bias among interviewees
Of the 16 individuals interviewed, 12 (75%) were from South Africa, 2 (12.5%) 
were from Zimbabwe, 1 (6.25%) was from Botswana, and 1 (6.25%) was from Lesotho. 
This distribution is largely due to a more developed human resource infrastructure within
14 According to the “grounded theory” methodology illustrated in Chapter 3, the researcher must continue to sample until 
the data are “saturated” (i.e., no new or relevant data would likely emerge from further sampling).
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South Africa. The South African government is simply able to employ more individuals in 
transfrontier conservation than any other country within sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, 
responses are inherently biased towards South African perspectives. Furthermore, South 
Africa is a participating nation-state in both study sites. Finally, it is clear from the list of 
interviewees that a particular bias exists towards males with power.
Short fieldwork period
The population sampled included high-level government officials, NGO directors 
and employees, and academics -  all of whom were extremely busy and had virtually 
inflexible schedules. While only one interviewee cancelled an appointment, there were 
four potential interviewees (2 from South Africa, 1 from Lesotho, and 1 from Botswana) 
who were unable to meet during the three-month period of fieldwork.
While there were challenges encountered, they were of an unavoidable nature. The 
integrity of the research, however, was largely maintained and provided an atmosphere 
conducive for emergent categories, concepts, and theories that served to clarify the research 
questions and facilitate the realization of the four objectives of this research. In short, 
while there were challenges in collecting the data, none were significant enough to warrant 
the data irrelevant or inapplicable; the results must simply be considered subject to the 
constraint of these challenges.
Emergent categories, concepts, and theories
Throughout the course of the research, a number of categories and concepts 
emerged which led to substantive theory concerning the relationship between international 
law and TFCAS as well as the implications of this relationship for community involvement
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in TFCA initiatives. Below is a table delineating the categories, concepts, and theory that 
emerged throughout the course of analysis.
Categories Concepts Theories
International law and 
institutional accountability
•  Sanctions
•  Donors
•  Institutional structures
•  Progress reporting
•  Delegation of 
responsibility
International accountability is 
achieved principally through 
three different mechanisms: 
sanctions, institutional structures, 
and donors
Accountability is established 
through progress reporting that 
takes place between institutional 
structures and delegation of 
responsibility through these 
channels.
Formalization
•  Formalization may not 
always be necessary or 
desired.
•  Funding
•  Pre-existing cross-border 
management
•  Significant vs. 
insignificant 
management actions
•  Parties with a vested 
interest
•  Number of parties 
involved
Formalization of TFCA 
agreements might not always be 
necessary or desired.
The necessity of TFCA 
agreement formalization is based 
on:
1. Donor funding
2. Pre-existing cross- 
border management.
3. The significance of 
management actions.
4. The types of parties 
involved.
5. The number of parties 
involved.
The Treaty of SADC as a 
mandate
•  Diversity of views
•  Political will
•  Capacity
•  Necessity
There are a diversity of views 
regarding the Treaty of SADC as 
a mandate (e.g., with respect to 
community involvement).
Viewing the Treaty of SADC as a 
mandate is largely based on a 
nation-state’s political will and 
capacity to implement the 
agreement as well as the 
necessity to view the agreement 
as a mandate.
Limiting factors of 
implementation
• Political will
• Capacity
The implementation of 
international agreements 
related to TFCAs is 
dependent upon a nation­
state’s political will and
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capacity to do so.
The potential role of SADC
• Mediator
• Set regional TFCA 
standards
• Protecting community 
rights
• Coordinate donor 
funding
• Capacity
• Strong vs. weak role
• Peace Parks Foundation 
partnership
The Southern Africa 
Development Community could 
potentially fulfill several roles 
including:
• Mediator between 
participating nation­
states.
• Setting regional 
standards for TFCAs
• Protecting community 
rights through protocols 
and agreements
• Coordinating donor 
funding
While most nation-states would 
like to see SADC play some role 
in TFCA initiatives, most would 
like to see SADC play a 
secondary role.
SADC is planning to fulfill some 
of these roles through a 
partnership with the Peace Parks 
Foundation.
The potential role of 
African Union
• Continental charter
• Normalized values
• Human rights
• Political clout
Given the African Union’s 
continental charter, it is not likely 
that they will address region- 
specific issues. Rather they will 
focus on normalized issues such 
as human rights. They will 
however be a powerful 
organization given their political 
clout.
Table 3 -  Emergent categories, concepts, and theories
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  i s  d e v o t e d  t o  e x p a n d i n g  t h e  f i n d i n g s  a n d  r e s u l t s  o f  e a c h  
c a t e g o r y .  I n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  d o i n g  s o ,  a  n u m b e r  o f  q u o t e s  w i l l  b e  p r o v i d e d  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  
f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e o r i e s .  W h i l e  t h e  q u o t e s  h i g h l i g h t e d  b e l o w  a r e  n o t  a  c o m p l e t e  l i s t  o f  r e l e v a n t  
r e s p o n s e s ,  t h e y  d o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  d o m i n a n t  r e s p o n s e s  a n d  d i s p l a y  t h e  s p e c t r u m  o f  c o n c e p t s  
t h a t  e m e r g e d .
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Discussion of emergent categories, concepts, and theories
International law and institutional accountability
The principle function of international agreements is to establish a formal system of 
international accountability. International accountability, as stated and understood by its 
architects, can be defined as liability or responsibility imposed upon a collection of nation­
states to carry out a set of actions declared through international law (Slomanson 2003). In 
the case of international agreements relevant to TFCAs, this is achieved principally through 
three different mechanisms: sanctions, institutional structures, and donors. Each of these 
three mechanisms is dramatically different in terms of both effectiveness and evolution 
with respect to TFCAs in southern Africa.
The Treaty of SADC states that in any instance where the Treaty is violated, 
sanctions may be imposed upon the nation-state in violation. Nevertheless, as several 
respondents noted, sanctions are rarely imposed against any nation-state around the world 
for violating international law -  particularly conservation-based violations (see Box 1). In 
essence, conservation based violations simply aren’t considered serious enough to justify 
sanctions.
Perhaps the best way to establish accountability is to embed it within the 
institutional structures surrounding TFCAs and to create chains of responsibility and 
reporting. Every TFCA memorandum of understanding (MOU) or treaty establishing and 
guiding TFCA management has created an organizational framework delineating the way 
in which conflicts are resolved and responsibility is delegated. The basic organizational
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model for TFCAs consists of several structures15, including international donors, heads of 
state, a ministerial committee, a joint management board, nation-state management 
committees, and nation-state task forces (see Fig. 5).
“Granted, sanctions don’t occur often, but I’m sorry to say that I feel that if 
there were no sanctions, nothing would happen. In any case where a country 
is responsible for it’s actions, if that country doesn’t live up to the promises 
they’ve made, there needs to be consequences. Unfortunately, in the 
international arena, that doesn’t happen too often.”
“I don’t think they would go that far... It’s not warranted first of all. In the 
case of environmental stuff, I think the priority for SADC is peace and 
security... These [TFCAs] are further on down the line.”
“Sanctions are rarely imposed with any violations of international law. You 
may find that they exist with some instances of law such as significant 
human rights violations like in Zimbabwe, but in general, conservation 
issues are simply not seen as being important enough to merit the imposition 
of sanctions...”
Box 1 -  TFCAs and Sanctions
Several respondents noted that accountability is established by (1) progress reporting that 
must take place between each connected structure and (2) delegation of responsibility 
through these channels (which gives rise to a traceable path of action).
Involvement of donors can be one of the most effective means of instituting 
accountability within a TFCA initiative. In every instance where a donor contributes 
funding to a TFCA initiative, a formal agreement is established between the donor and the 
participating nation-states. Given the pecuniary nature of the agreement, there is a high 
level of financial accountability expected through the agreement. Furthermore, since donor
15 The name o f each o f these structures differs across TFCAs, but the fundamental model and mission o f each remains the 
same.
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Fig. 5 -  TFCA Organizational Structure
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funding for TFCAs often requires specific management actions, implementing agencies are 
indirectly accountable to donors for those actions. Officials within Kwa-Zulu Natal 
Wildlife noted that the agreement between the Global Environment Facility and the 
countries of Lesotho and South Africa is the most detailed and accountable agreement 
governing the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area.
Of equal importance, with respect to accountability, is the Ministerial Committee 
(composed of the Ministers of Environment, Tourism, and Development of each 
participating nation), which guides the overall mission of the TFCA.
Below the Ministerial Committee sits the Joint Management Board composed of 
high-ranking officials from land management agencies within each participating State and, 
in some TFCAs, a representative from the SADC Secretariat. The goal of this committee is 
to assess the principle challenges facing the TFCA and then delegate responsibility to the 
nation-state management committees that will act to mitigate those challenges and report 
their progress to the Joint Management Board.
The nation-state management committees and task groups carry out the commission 
of addressing specific problems facing the TFCA. In most cases, individual task groups 
exist for tourism, wildlife management, national security, foreign affairs, and community 
issues (Verhoef 2003). In fact, it is the community task force, to which members of 
surrounding communities are invited to send representatives, that serves as the community 
voice in TFCA matters (Verhoef 2003).
Formalization
Accountability is primarily a function of agreement formalization. For the purpose 
of this study,formalization is defined as the creation of written rules that are promulgated
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through a treaty or international agreement and are considered legally binding. Like 
implementation of and recognition of agreements, formalization of agreements is 
dependent upon a nation-state’s political will and capacity to formalize agreements as well 
as it’s perceived necessity to do so.
In theory, the greater the degree of formalization - the greater the degree of 
accountability (the contrapositive and converse being true, as well). Despite the benefits of 
accountability, formalization is not something that is always desired by nation-states. As 
noted by a respondent, cooperation in the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park was “much 
smoother before there were any agreements.” Considering the context-specific nature of the 
desire for formalization, it may be wise to assess the need for agreement formalization prior 
to engaging in TFCA initiatives. Provided there is both the capacity and political will for 
formalization, below are some initiatial questions that nation-states might consider in 
assessing the need for formalization:
1. Is the initiative heavily funded by donors (or could it be)?
If the TFCA is heavily funded, then it might be wise to consider formalizing 
agreements to estabilsh a system of financial accountability. If it is not funded, 
but could be, formalization will be attractive to potential donors
“One of the main reasons why we have so many formal agreements is 
that they are necessary in order for us to receive funding; we have to 
have financial accountability. This is particularly true when multiple 
countries are involved and we need to track who bears the costs and 
receives the benefits.”
“There’s no way we would be able to get any money without an 
agreement. If a Transfrontier project wants to receive any sort of 
funding, they have to have [an agreement]”
Box 2 -  Formalization and donor funding
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2. What are the cross-border management iniatives?
If the management initiatives are substantial, then formalization might be 
necessary to establish an organizing framework and management accountabiltiy.
“Transfrontier conservation areas often involve very complex projects and 
programs. It’s desirable to have an organizing framework if we’re going to 
undertake complex actions. An organization needs to have some sort of 
framework to operate effectively”
“A lot of times we hear complaints that agreements and plans create what 
you call ‘red-tape,’ and that it is a bad thing. One of the most important 
things that I’ve learned is that sometimes that ‘red-tape’ forces us to think 
about the actions we are taking. If there were no agreements for these 
initiatives, we could potentially make quick decisions, but they stand a 
better chance of being bad ones.”
“The Great Limpopo [TFCA] would never be able to implement an 
elephant re-location plan without an operational and written plan between 
the countries involved.”
“If you’re not going to do anything major, why would you need a formal 
agreement? I can see needing a formal agreement for major projects, but 
not for anything minor. A lot of that need for formal agreements can be 
taken care of by sharing or combining management plans.”
“Yes, it is true that when there are substantial management actions 
agreements and treaties can help, but what treaties and agreements must 
also do is consider the long-term goals of the area. For the most part, I 
don’t see that in any of the agreements. The result is that agreements must 
constantly be written and revised. We need some long-term goals.”
Box 3 — Formalization and management actions
3. Is cross-border management already taking place?
If cross-border management is already taking place and (1) few parties are 
engaged, (2) no donors are funding the project, (3) no substantial management 
actions are taking place, and (4) local communities do not have a vested interest in 
the TFCA, then it might not be necessary to formalize agreements.
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“We’ve been cooperating just fine for a very long time, why would we 
want to do anything to damage that now? Personally, I don’t see any 
need for international law governing [TFCAs] when everything is going 
fine”
“Sometimes cooperation is better when there aren’t treaties to get in the 
way. International law and other agreements tend to tie things up. Let 
me say, however, that if there were major management actions planned 
for a transfrontier project, you need some sort of plan. The question, 
then, is if  that plan should be in the form of international law. Typically, 
what would happen in that case is that the law should maybe state broad 
principles and then each country develops a plan of action from those 
principles which is more specific.”
“As long as good cooperation is already taking place, I don’t think a 
treaty is necessary.”
Box 4 -  Formalization and pre-existing cooperation
4. Do surrounding communities have a vested interest?
If surrounding communities have a vested interest in the TFCA project, then it 
might be necessary to formalize agreements to establish social accountability.
“If there are local communities in or around the [TFCA] area, how else are 
the countries going to be held accountable to them? Many of these 
communities have been in a bad situation for a long time and there’s a lot 
of mistrust between them and the government. Having some sort of 
agreement between them and the government would help to build trust.”
“The good thing about treaties and other agreements is that, theoretically, 
they establish a certain dimension of accountability to the communities. I 
think in big projects like these parks, it’s warranted.”
“I think we owe it to the communities to sit down and write up agreements, 
because often what happens if that agreement doesn’t exist is that they’ll 
never be involved. Also, communities will not tolerate not being involved 
anymore. So the government has to sit down with community leaders and 
come up with agreements.”
Box 5 -  Formalization and community interests
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5. How many parties (e.g., agencies and NGOs) are participating in the initiative?
The more parties involved, the more complex the TFCA initiative will be. 
Formalization might be required in order to provide an operational framework that 
exhibits how responsibility is delegated and establishes managerial and financial 
accountability.
“The more agencies and organizations involved, the more complex it 
gets, and the greater the need for some sort of organizing agreement... 
it’s as simple as that...”
“These projects involve a lot of different organizations, both national 
and international, a lot agencies, and communities. When you have so 
many different bodies involved, It’s useful to have something guiding 
you when you have a number of entities involved in these projects.”
Box 6 -  Formalization and multiple party involvement
C o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  a b o v e  r e s p o n s e s ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  f o r m a l i z e  a g r e e m e n t s  i s  f r o u g h t  w i t h  
c o m p l e x i t y .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  i s  a  d e c i s i o n  t h a t  m u s t  b e  e i t h e r  e x p l i c i d y  o r  i m p l i c i t l y  m a d e  w i t h  
a n y  T F C A .  B y  a a s s e s s i n g  e a c h  q u e s t i o n ,  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  m i g h t  b e t t e r  e q u i p  t h e m s e l v e s  t o  m a k e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  d e c i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  f o r m a l i z a t i o n .  I n  a n y  c a s e ,  f o r m a l i z a t i o n  i s  s t i l l  o n l y  o n e  
c o m p o n e n t  i n  t h e  p o l i c y  p r o c e s s .  O n c e  a g r e e m e n t s  h a v e  b e e n  f o r m a l i z e d ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  t h e n  
b e c o m e s  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  w i l l  a c t u a l l y  v i e w  t h a t  f o r m a l  a g r e e m e n t  a s  a  m a n d a t e .
The Treaty o f SADC as a mandate
Despite formalization, international agreements and other pieces of international 
law still might not be recognized as a mandate. While a lack of recognition may be 
attributed to a number of factors, in general, it is a function of political will and capacity. 
Many agreements and treaties have been authored or ratified by nation-states within
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southern Africa, but confusion surrounds a number of them regarding their status as a 
mandate. One such treaty is the Treaty of SADC.
To better assess the Treaty of SADC and its Wildlife Protocol as a mandate for 
community involvement in TFCA initiatives, perhaps it is best to first acknowledge the 
holistic attitudes towards the Treaty of SADC and international law. With the fall of 
apartheid in 1994, South Africa (and southern Africa) underwent a political 
transformation of massive proportions that eventually centered it as a significant global 
actor and re-centered and internationalized its political agendas. Inevitably, with 
increased international activity came participation in international agreements and 
subjectivity to international law. Participation in international agreements and awareness 
and implementation of international law, however, are two separate things (see Box 7). 
Furthermore, nearly all implementing agencies within southern Africa, such as South 
Africa National Parks or Botswana Department of Wildlife and National Parks are largely 
unaware of the implications of international law.
The unawareness or the lack of acknowledgement of the Treaty of SADC and 
international law relevant to TFCAs might, in part, be a manifestation of the apparent 
delay in implementation following promulgation. As with virtually all pieces of 
international law, critical decisions regarding international law relevant to TFCAs are 
made at the Presidential and Ministerial level. And, at both levels, the Treaty of SADC 
and its corresponding protocols are recognized by many nation-states in southern Africa 
as a mandate. Despite the recognition of the Treaty of SADC as a mandate, though, 
policy simply moves faster than implementation in southern Africa (see Box 8).
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“Many countries within southern Africa are new democracies or will be 
soon. There’s a lot of good ideas and they want to form these into law. 
Countries within southern Africa, however, are much better at creating 
international law than implementing it. I would expect that someday, 
though, this could change when the capacity is there to implement it.”
“In working with TFCAs, I have never come across anything dealing 
with international law to speak of.”
“I’m not entirely sure how international law is connected to transfrontier 
parks. I’ve never encountered it. I mean I guess I could see how it would 
be relevant since were talking about international projects, but we’ve 
never needed it before.”
“When it comes to transboundary conservation initiatives, it 
[international law] is not even in our vocabulary. This is changing 
though, I think. I believe we’ll find that it’s [international law] necessary 
if these things [TFCAs] are going to work”
Box 7 -  TFCAs and the awareness of international law
“I think it is an inherent problem with any conservation initiative in 
southern Africa, that your community liaison processes are a lot slower 
than your political decision making processes. It can take as a long as a 
year to simply establish a recognizable community entity and liaison 
mechanism with which you can begin to talk.”
“You have to remember that many countries in southern Africa are new 
democracies. What this means is that we have a lot of good ideas, but we just 
might not have the capacity or means to implement them. I don’t think this will 
the be the case forever, but for now it is.”
“I think in many governments the policy moves faster than the on the ground 
enactment of that policy. So I would say it is incorrect to say that we are not 
implementing any of the agreements. I think we are in the process of doing it; 
you just have to be patient.”
Box 8 -  International law and implementation
76
Furthermore, recognition of the Treaty of SADC as a mandate does not 
automatically imply that the connection is made between the Treaty of SADC and the 
Wildlife protocol to imply that community involvement is mandated in TFCA initiatives. 
Officials from South Africa and Botswana, all of whom stated that their respective 
governments acknowledged the Treaty of SADC as international law, differed in their 
interpretation with respect to community involvement. All but one respondent claimed 
that community involvement in TFCA initiatives was considered a mandate of the Treaty 
of SADC and its Wildlife Protocol (see Box 9).
“No, I don’t think that realization [of the Treaty of SADC and its Wildlife 
Protocol as a mandate for community involvement] exists. In actual fact, I was 
discussing with my peers this morning because they actually wanted to [send] 
legislation to the cabinet requesting blanket approval for TFCAs so that the 
concept is approved by Cabinet. And, I pointed out that it is already part of the 
Wildlife protocol, which has been approved by Cabinet, and ratified by 
parliament, and they said it was not a sufficient mandate.”
Box 9 - The Treaty of SADC as a mandate
The respondent continued by stating that he had “never heard of anyone within 
the ... government refer to the Wildlife Protocol or the Treaty of SADC as a mandate for 
community involvement.” Nevertheless, nearly all nation-states within the southern 
African region have national legislation that is well-recognized as mandating community 
involvement in all conservation initiatives, and according to one interviewee, “this makes 
it very difficult to measure the Treaty of SADC as a mandate -  community involvement 
is already occurring in several instances and it is virtually impossible to determine what 
legislation was considered in implementing community involvement initiatives.”
While there may be discordance among nation-states with respect to the 
relationship between SADC and community involvement in transfrontier conservation
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area initiatives, the SADC Secretariat’s office adamantly maintains that a mandate exists 
(Enock 2003).
“[Community involvement] is one of [SADC’s] areas of intervention in 
transfrontier conservation area initiatives, because the establishment of 
transfrontier conservation areas is [meant] to improve the life condition of 
the community, especially those involved.”
Box 10 — The SADC secretariat and community involvement
Limiting factors o f implementation
Despite the inherent difficulty of assessing the role of SADC in TFCAs and 
community involvement, it is evident that community involvement is being implemented 
in TFCAs as a result of an abstract corpus of international agreements and national law 
and policy including the Treaty of SADC, the Biodiversity Convention, TFCA MOUs 
and Treaties, and donor agreements (Verhoef 2003 and Zunckel 2003). However, 
implementation is variable across TFCAs in southern Africa and is a function of both 
political will and capacity.
As with many pieces of international law, a lack of political will can be the 
principal hindrance of implementation. According to one interviewee, “They 
[international agreements] started as quite bold statements, but that doesn’t mean that 
they will be implemented.” A lack of political will to implement international 
agreements relating to TFCAs can be attributed to a variety of reasons (see Box 11).
In addition to unwanted attention, a nation-state’s political will is also a function 
of its perception of what it considers to be more pressing issues. As one respondent
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noted, in southern Africa, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is currently receiving much more 
attention than conservation, and governments typically funnel resources to implement 
health and development programs rather than conservation-based programs. 
Notwithstanding treaties and agreements relevant to TFCAs, southern Africa’s larger 
health and developmental problems must be resolved before implementation of those 
agreements can be expected to take place. When asked about the role of SADC and the 
African Union in TFCA initiatives, one interviewee responded, “don’t they have more 
important things to take care of first?”
A second limiting factor of implementation is a nation-state’s capacity (i.e., 
ability) to implement agreements. The consensus among the respondents was that 
southern Africa simply doesn’t have the resources or political consensus at both macro- 
and micro-levels to implement the agreements they have forged.
“There’s somewhat of a tension between the international community and 
the national community. For the Basotho people [of Lesotho], the cross- 
border movements are economically very important to them, or being able 
to rustle cattle and sell Marijuana at the borders is crucial, and I think that 
if that was closed off, it would create problems for their politicians back 
home. So, there seems to be political will for the transfrontier initiatives 
from what I understand, but there seems to be a reluctance to pass law that 
would effect these agreements... In many cases, nation-State compliance 
would be domestic suicide. So, they don’t go on with it. They’re called 
paper parks.”
“A lot of times these parks may sound good on paper, but government may still 
not buy into the idea. For example, do governments really want to involve 
communities in these [TFCA] projects? I think they should, but the government 
may not always think so. There’s a long history hear of communities and 
indigenous people not being involved. I think some traditionalists don’t want to 
see that changed. It is changing though, and it’s for the better ”
“Just because it is written down, it doesn’t mean our leaders like it.”
Box 11 — Political will and implementation
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With respect to macro-level resources, donor funding and international assistance was the 
most frequently cited need (see Box 12).
“When the Americans were there, they helped greatly with the capacity 
building... it worked like a charm while they were there. But, what they 
were able to do was to put to put in place a demonstration project [the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project] that worked extremely well for the 
period that they were around. They [Lesotho] cannot do it on their own, 
that is impossible. The same is true for the Maloti-Drakensberg TFCA.”
“These programs require tremendous capacity. There is no way we can ... 
implement them without the assistance of the donor community. We hope 
to continue to receive funding because it will make these programs 
possible.”
“We need money for TFCAs...”
Box 12 -  TFCAs and donor funding
At the micro-level, training emerged as the principle capacity need, particularly 
within local communities. According to one respondent, community involvement in TFCA 
initiatives should appear in every dimension of the initiatives, including the acquisition of 
funds, but “there’s a tremendous amount of capacity that needs to be built to get them to 
understand the basic financial management principles to get them in a position where they 
are strong enough to write their own funding proposals, to write their own business plans, 
etc.”
The respondents comments suggest that implementation of international agreements 
relevant to TFCA initiatives is dependent on a nation-state’s political will to implement the 
agreements and its capacity to achieve the initiative’s objectives. Nevertheless, attempting 
to simultaneously maximize both political will and capacity might not be the best approach.
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Before capacity can be built, political will that would perpetuate the building of that 
capacity and permit it to occur, must be present. Thus, implementation regarding 
international agreements related to southern Africa TFCAs can be perceived as a linear 
process beginning with the promulgation of international agreements occurring either 
simultaneously with or before a development of political will (see Fig. 6); the 
implementation process is then perpetuated by a development of capacity followed by 
explicit implementation.
promulgation
agreements
capacity
building
agreement
implementation
evidence of 
political will
Fig. 6 -  The Implementation of International Agreements
The potential role o f SADC in TFCA initiatives
W h i l e ,  i n  s o m e  i n s t a n c e s ,  t h e r e  i s  a  l a c k  o f  r e c o g n i t i o n  a n d / o r  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  
T r e a t y  o f  S A D C  a s  m a n d a t e ,  t h i s  d o e s  n o t  p r e c l u d e  t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  S A D C  t o  p l a y  a  s t r o n g e r  
r o l e  i n  t r a n s f r o n t i e r  c o n s e r v a t i o n .  I n  m o s t  c a s e s ,  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  s e e  S A D C  p l a y  
t h e  r o l e  o f  a  t h i r d - p a r t y  a g e n t  o f  T F C A  i n i t i a t i v e s .  A s  a  t h i r d - p a r t y  a g e n t ,  i t  c o u l d  s e r v e  s e v e r a l  
f u n c t i o n s  ( s e e  B o x  1 3 ) .  Many respondents noted, however, that they don’t see SADC as 
having an active and hands-on approach (see Box 14).
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The Southern African Development Community is responding to all of these 
potential roles through two actions: the creation of a SADC TFCA sector and a potential 
partnership with the Peace Parks Foundation. The mission of the TFCA sector is to 
provide technical expertise to nation-states engaged in TFCA initiatives to serve as a 
catalyst for the development of basic standards for TFCAs within the region, and fulfill the 
mediator role when conflicts surrounding TFCAs arise. This action has been well received 
by nation-states in southern Africa, while the potential partnership with the Peace Parks 
Foundation has been inundated with controversy and skepticism.
“... our [SADC’s] role is to facilitate and coordinate in line with our protocols... 
So, we act as a depositor to all projects regarding the establishment of transfrontier 
conservation areas. This role will become stronger as more TFCAs are established 
and we want to be involved in an appropriate and helpful role.”
“Even though we may not view SADC as a mandate, we would still like to see 
them involved to a certain level... they could fulfill several roles...”
“It [SADC] could ensure there is a possibility of harmonizing the Treaty 
agreements and act as a mediator between countries. It could ensure that in the 
TFCAs there are certain regional development objectives being met. Thirdly, 
SADC could play a very important role in protecting the rights of communities 
and could have more influence than individual countries. It could also coordinate 
donor funding or other forms of investment. But, of course, SADC needs to 
develop the capacity to do that, which it doesn’t have.”
“When we get to the benefits of the project [The Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier 
Conservation and Development Area], there might be tensions about who gets 
what, which might lead to one party withdrawing. The involvement of such a 
body could be as a mediator for such things”
Box 13 -  The potential role of SADC
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“The more they [SADC] take on, the less they empower people and they will have 
bigger problems in sustaining themselves. Their best role is a light one. By taking 
on a light role, the countries can continue to work together but still get the benefits 
of having a body like SADC help them.”
“Yes, we would like to see them [SADC] play a role, but it must be a secondary 
role. If it is a strong role, communities like we’ve been discussing, will not trust 
the process if it’s too centralized. So, I see SADC playing a role, but it has to be a 
minor one. But, just because it’s minor doesn’t mean it’s not important.”
“I just don’t see SADC having a strong interest if they do in fact have one. I think 
having a real strong interest or role would be self-defeating. Countries must 
primarily make the decisions. Any interest that SADC has should be second to 
them [countries].”
Box 14 — SADC’s influence
Recognizing the Peace Park Foundation’s success in acquiring funds for TFCAs, 
SADC hopes to forge a partnership that would insure the financial viability of both current 
and future TFCAs throughout the region. Nevertheless, the partnership is not without 
criticism. The Peace Parks Foundation, a private organization and a major broker for 
TFCA initiatives, has been labeled as having neo-imperialistic interests. One respondent 
provided an example of the expert-driven philosophy they believed the Peace Parks 
Foundation embodied (see Box 15). When questioned about this, Wemer Mhyburg, 
project coordinator for the Peace Parks Foundation noted, “we have been criticized, but 
we’re just here to assist where we can in the establishment of Peace Parks. If our critics 
want to talk, let them talk; we’re just here to help.”
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“For community representatives to participate on the actual management of a 
national park is something unfair to the community themselves. In most cases the 
people that are appointed to manage a national park have gone and done years of 
studying to gain a tertiary education. They’re well qualified... I know a lot of critics 
are advocating for it [community involvement], but in my mind it is the same as 
having someone living next to an airport come and sit next to the air traffic 
controller... You can’t make them air traffic controllers.”
Box 15 -  The Peace Parks and criticism regarding community involvement
The potential role o f African Union
In addition to SADC, another international organization that has the potential to 
play a significant role in TFCA initiatives is the African Union (see Box 16). The key 
instrument by which it could play a role is its New Partnership for African Development 
Treaty (NEPAD), which is a promulgation of the continent’s desire to move forward with 
economic and developmental initiatives. One potential way in which this can be 
accomplished in an environmental setting is through TFCA initiatives (Hanks 2003).
Unlike SADC, though, the African Union has a continental constituency which 
implies that:
a) The African Union could address more normative issues, such as human rights, 
compared to the issue specific concerns of SADC.
b) The African Union could exercise significant political clout.
c) The African Union might define principles and practices which SADC might 
align itself with and implement.
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“The African Union represents an entire continent where SADC’s jurisdiction is 
essentially sub-Saharan Africa. Given that, they can’t address very specific issues; 
they can only make broad proclamations. For example, I’m not sure if they will 
ever formally make provisions for TFCAs. I know there will be a presentation on 
the Great Limpopo at the upcoming [African Union] summit, but I don’t know if 
they’ll ever form a mission on them. I think they’re more likely to address 
normalized issues given their continental charter, rather than developing region- 
specific standards for TFCAs.”
“The African Union has more exposure and more control mechanisms [than SADC] 
from the international community and other continents. So, from that point of view, 
they may have more influence than a regional group such as SADC. I think this is 
particularly true with NEPAD. There’s a lot o f excitement surrounding [NEPAD] 
and if  countries have the capacity to implement [NEPAD] it could be a great thing.”
“The most critical role that they [the African Union] can play is that they have an 
impact on legislation pertaining to the rights of individuals within Africa. I don’t 
think it’s within their realm or responsibility to develop rules for TFCAs. But the 
rules they do develop could substantially effect [TFCAs]”
“I wouldn’t differentiate too much between SADC and the African Union. I see 
SADC as a subset of the African Union and it should be implementing the principles 
of the Union.”
“What we want to do is to align SADC’s initiatives with the African Union’s and 
work with and through them.”
Box 16 -  TFCAs and the African Union
Variability of results among study sites
As is evident from the preceding discussion, there was very little distinction made 
between respondents who were associated with different study sites. One of the most 
interesting results from this study was the lack of variability of responses from individuals 
associated with the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park as compared to those associated with the 
Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area. In fact there was 
no significant difference among the respondents notwithstanding questions concerning 
formalization of agreements. With respect to formalization, it was clear that individuals
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associated with or speaking in terms of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park desired 
formalization of agreements to a much lesser extent than those involved with the Maloti- 
Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area. This might be attributed 
to a number of factors including:
• The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park has been a de facto TFCA since 1948, whereas 
the Maloti Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area was 
only established in 2001. Officials from the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park feel that 
management of the TFCA has been going very well without formalized agreements 
and despite its formal establishment in 1999, they see no need to formalize 
agreements concerning the area.
• The Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area 
appears to be receiving much more donor funding than the Kgalagadi Transfrontier 
Park and, thus, requires more formalization.
• There appears to be a greater number of parties involved with the Maloti- 
Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area than the Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park. The larger number of parties involved with the Maloti- 
Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area magnify the 
complexity of the initiative and necessitates formal agreements to guide the actions 
of those parties.
These differences provide interesting insight into the contextual circumstances for 
each TFCA. Based on the analysis of the data gathered for this study, the Maloti- 
Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation Area is a TFCA that requires a high degree of 
formalization, whereas the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park has thus far resisted efforts to 
formalize many agreements. As was anticipated in this study’s infancy, both TFCAs have 
provided for a thought-provoking and useful contrast.
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Key insights
In summary, the data and discussion presented above reveal a number of key 
insights regarding the role of international law in TFCAs and it’s role in community 
involvement within those areas:
1. The foundation for accountability in TFCA initiatives is established vis-a-vis 
international agreements and the required institutional structures established 
through those agreements, one of the strongest agreements being that between 
participating nation-states and the donor(s).
2. The need for formalization of international agreements related to TFCA initiatives 
is context specific and dependent upon:
a. donor funding;
b. the nature of cross-border management initiatives;
c. local community interest in TFCA initiatives; and
d. the number of parties involved in a TFCA initiative.
3. While most respondents within southern Africa recognize the Treaty of SADC as 
international law, it is questionable as to whether or not the Treaty, along with the 
Wildlife Protocol, are viewed as a mandate for community involvement in TFCA 
initiatives. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to determine if existing 
community involvement is a result of national or international mandates.
4. Implementation and recognition of international law (or lack thereof) is principally 
a function of implementation capacity and political will.
5. Nation-states in southern Africa would like to see SADC play a role in TFCA 
initiatives. This role might include:
a. Acting as a mediator between nation-states engaged in TFCA initiatives
b. Protecting the rights of communities in and around TFCAs
c. Coordinating donor funding
d. Setting regional standards for TFCAs
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6. In addition to SADC, the African Union also could play a role in TFCA initiatives. 
Unlike SADC, though, the African Union, as a continental organization, will be 
more inclined to address normalized issues rather than region-specific concerns.
The summary of findings above implies that the interface between international law 
and TFCAs is both complex and substantially rooted in notions of political will and 
capacity. Furthermore, a nation-state’s decision to recognize certain pieces of international 
law as a mandate are dependent upon their desire to formalize agreements that may or may 
not have previously existed. Responses from individuals associated with the Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park and the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and 
Development Area have illustrated the importance of looking beyond surface observations 
and deeper into the motivations for observing international law as a mandate and call to 
action. Through this study, perhaps a better understanding of these motivations can be 
reached that will lead to an greater appreciation of TFCAs as a valuable tool for 
conservation world-wide.
C h a p t e r  5
CONCLUSION
Transfrontier conservation areas in southern Africa have pioneered a means of 
large-scale conservation that could potentially provide a number of benefits ranging from 
increased peace between nation-states within the region to the restoration of historic 
wildlife migration routes. Given that most of the benefits touted by proponents require 
significant management actions between sovereign entities, organizational frameworks 
establishing more accountability than a general management plan will be necessary to 
bind nation-states to action. In theory, international law establishes such a framework. 
While international law may be an appropriate venue for these needs, it is not without 
challenges.
As demonstrated through this study, the challenges of international law are 
particularly apparent with respect to community involvement in TFCA initiatives. 
Generally speaking, nation-states view international agreements -  such as the Treaty of 
SADC -  as international law, but disagreement exists among nation-states regarding the 
legitimacy of specific provisions related to community involvement in TFCA initiatives. 
As indicated by the respondents, the lack of recognition and implementation of 
provisions related to community involvement are, largely, a function of a nation-states 
desire to formalize agreements.
The desire for formalization, as an impetus for agreement recognition and 
implementation is further dependent upon a nation-states capacity and political will to 
formalize agreements as well as it’s perceived necessity to formalize. Assuming there is
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both political will and capacity to formalize agreements, the five questions raised in the 
previous chapter regarding the necessity of formalization could potentially serve as the 
foundation for a useful model to assess the need for agreement formalization (see Figure
7) .
Formalization 
may not be 
necessary
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Figure 7 -  A model to assess the need for formalized agreements in TFCA 
initiatives
In implementing this model, nation-states must systematically consider each 
question and the implications of respective answers. While “Is the initiative heavily 
funded, or could it be?” serves as the starting point on this model, the ordering of the
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questions is arbitrary and not important; the result will be the same under any ordering. 
While the ordering is not important, given that each question motivates a particular 
dimension of formalization, nation-states must consider all of the questions. For instance, 
if it is decided that formalization must occur on account of the potential for donor 
funding, nation-states may still want to consider other questions such as “Do 
communities or other parties have a vested interest in the initiative” since responses to 
these questions will shape the formalization of an agreement, as well.
Despite decisions to not formalize agreements and any lack of recognition and 
implementation of SADC’s provisions, nation-states envisage international governmental 
organizations, such as SADC and the African Union, playing a larger role in transfrontier 
conservation than they do at present. Possible expanded roles could include third-party 
mediation, conflict resolution, coordinating donor funding, setting regional TFCA 
standards, and protecting the rights of communities in and around TFCAs. An in-depth 
analysis of the logistics behind international governmental organization involvement in 
TFCA initiatives is among the needed TFCA-based research.
In addition to an in-depth analysis of the role of international governmental 
organizations in transfrontier conservation, the respondents cited several research needs 
concerning transfrontier conservation areas. Two of the most frequently mentioned 
research needs were:
1. an analysis of the necessary conditions and specific needs for cross-border 
community involvement in transfrontier conservation areas compared to that of 
domestic community involvement in national protected areas and
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2. the implications of transfrontier conservation for national security (and vice 
versa).
The re-establishment of community relations severed by colonial boundaries has 
been one of the most vocalized benefits of TFCA initiatives. A component of the re­
establishment of these relations is cross-border community involvement in the joint 
management of TFCAs. As opposed to domestic community involvement in 
conservation initiatives, cross-border community involvement requires communities from 
multiple nation-states to collectively organize their mutual interests and cooperatively 
participate in the management of a TFCA. Currently, little is being done by nation-states 
to actively engage cross-border community involvement. This is in part due to a lack of 
understanding concerning the different necessary conditions and specific needs for cross- 
border community involvement as compared to domestic community involvement. The 
respondents noted that a more thorough understanding of the nature of cross-border 
community involvement is necessary in order to understand why it is currently not being 
implemented to the desired extent.
The respondents also noted a need to assess the relationship between TFCAs and 
the idea of national security. Infringements on national security in TFCAs in southern 
Africa currently range from drug smuggling in the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier 
Conservation and Development Area to illegal immigration in the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Conservation Area. Ironically, both national security and TFCA initiatives 
are designed to ensure, facilitate, and promote peace between nation-states (albeit through 
different means), but a more thorough understanding of the tradeoffs and conflicting
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objectives associated with both frameworks is needed before either one can be considered a 
success in southern Africa.
The popularity of and interest in transfrontier conservation in southern Africa has 
surged during the past decade, primarily on account of the myriad benefits that they could 
potentially provide. Despite this recent attention, many of the conditions impeding the 
realization of those benefits have not been adequately identified. The uncertainty of the 
role of community involvement in TFCA initiatives in the context of international law 
presents only a subset of challenges facing these areas. This study has proposed that some 
of the important issues to consider with respect to TFCAs and international law are the 
desire for agreement formalization, the importance of political will and capacity, and 
determining the appropriate role for international organizations. Future research must also 
focus on broader socio-political and socio-cultural implications and how best to implement 
cross-border initiatives while preserving nation-state sovereignty. By doing so, TFCAs 
could be one of the most effective tools for conservation within the southern African region 
and they also might provide a conservation paradigm capable of being implemented 
worldwide.
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Appendix
Interviewees
• Vupenyo Dzingirai; Cultural Anthropologist, IUCN; Zimbabwe
• Bill Bainbridge; Former employee of Kwa-Zulu Natal Wildlife intimately 
involved in the establishment of the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier 
Conservation and Development Area; South Africa
• Malcom Draper, Professor, University of Natal; South Africa
• Kevan Zunckel; South African Coordinator, The Maloti-Drakensberg 
Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area, KZN Wildlife; South Africa
• Mike Kidd, Professor of Environmental Law, University of Natal School of Law; 
South Africa
•  Derek Potter, Head of Conservation, KZN Wildlife; South Africa
•  Johan Verhoef, Coordinator, The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation 
Area, South Africa National Parks; South Africa
•  Marind van Graan, Legal Specialist, South Africa National Parks; South Africa
•  Ernest Mokganedi, Director, Transfrontier Conservation Areas, South Africa 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism; South Africa
• Manuel Enock, Forestry aud Wildlife Expert, SADC Secretariat; Zimbabwe
• Jan Broekhuis, Assistant Director, Botswana Department of Wildlife and 
National Parks; Botswana
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• Trevor Sandwith, Director, CAPE Action and former South African Coordinator 
for the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area; 
South Africa
• Werner Myburg, Project Coordinator, Peace Parks Foundation; South Africa
• Motsami Damane, Director, Lesotho National Environment Secretariat; Lesotho
• Saliem Fakir, Director, IUCN -  South Africa; South Africa
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